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Abstract
The overall goal of my doctoral research activity is oriented in development of high
performance computing design techniques for high reliability of digital circuits. One
of the most critical environment aspect that could reduce the reliability of modern
VLSI technologies used for high performance computing is radiation. When a
set of radiation particle interact within the electronic systems by an exchange of
energy, several kinds of effects can be observed. The impact of radiation effects
on electronic devices can cause a misbehavior on the functionality of the circuit.
In order to apply strategies and techniques to tolerate these faults and errors, these
effects must be analyzed in details. Considering high frequency and smaller size of
recent technologies, the sensitivity of High Performance Computing toward radiation
is expected to be higher. Therefore, having more resilient mitigation technologies is
more relevant and necessary, which is the focus of my research activity.
Radiation-induced effects can lead different effects depending on the location
and time of the incident. If the effects of radiation incident lasts for a short period of
time, it is known as a transient fault. While, if the effects last for a longer duration, it
is known as a permanent fault. Therefore, my PhD dissertation is divided into two
main parts. The first part as the main part is dedicated to the transient fault, mostly
focusing on Single Event Transient while the second part is dedicated to the more
permanent fault such as Micro Single Event Latch-up and Total Ionizing Dose.
Considering Single Event Transient as the golden part of my research, it covers
different phases of this phenomena from the generation until the mitigation. The first
phase is dedicated to the physical modeling of these effects and evaluating the impact
of the radiation environment profile on the generated SET pulse. The second phase
is devoted to develop tools and algorithms for analyzing and predicting the behavior
of the effected device. As a last phase, the developed physical model and performed
analysis have been the golden keys to propose an efficient mitigation solution for
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robustness of the developed system against this phenomena. The proposed mitigation
solution has been knows as the first method able to filter Single Event Transient
pulses with zero-timing overhead. These methodologies have been applied to modern
High Performance Computing technologies with high frequency and smaller size
which lead to more critical condition for Single Event Transient effect.
This comprehensive proposed flow for analyzing and mitigating Single Event
Transient has been applied to several industrial projects such as EUCLID space
mission project with the goal of monitoring the dark space which the lunch planned
for 2020 carrying by European Space Agency. The developed SET analysis and
mitigation work-flow has been part of the handbook Space Product Assurance Tech-
niques for Radiation Effects Mitigation in ASICs and FPGAs handbook, published
by European Space Agency. Moreover, the developed set of tools has been known
as the Best EDA Tool for improving design automation for integrated circuits and
systems by IEEE Council on Electronic Design Automation.
However, as a part of my research activity, not only I focused on the Transient
effects, but I dedicated the second part of my dissertation to the evaluation of
permanent effects such as Single Event Latch-up and total Ionizing Dose. The
second effect I focused on is Single Event Latch-up which is one of the major
reliability concerns for VLSI device applied in safety critical applications. The
reduction of the circuit feature size and operating voltage levels are leading to a new
kind of latch-up called micro Single Event Latch-up. Single Event Latch-up tends
to occur near the input/output terminals of logic gates while micro Single Event
Latch-up may occur at various locations between layers. One of my main research
contribution is to propose a first 3D model for describing the 3D physical layout
description of the design including the interconnection resources and logic versatile.
This 3D layout description leads to analyze the sensitivity of the sub-micron circuitry
to Micro Single Event Latch-up phenomena with respect to the layout, depth, size
and density of the design. This methodology is considered as the first one applicable
to large industrial designs.
Bench-marking technologies are becoming increasingly attractive since their
configuration memory is almost immune to Single Event Upset. However, applied
in mission critical application, especially long term missions, the FPGA devices
are subject to cumulative ionizing damage, known as Total Ionizing Dose. Total
Ionizing Dose may affect the FPGA, causing performance degradation and eventually
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permanent damage. Therefore, I dedicated part of my research activity to propose a
physical model of Total Ionizing Dose effect in order to analyze the Total Ionizing
Dose effect on recent modern technologies.
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Chapter 1
Introduction on Radiation Effect on
Modern VLSI Technologies
Nowadays, electronic devices are used in a growing number of applications, starting
from personal computers and entertainment market to large-scale business frame-
works such as automobiles and satellites. Each application has its own requirements.
However, they are considered as mission critical applications if they are involved in a
huge amount of money or human lives. When electronic devices, in particular digital
circuits are used in mission critical applications, dependability of theses devices
is becoming an important issue. Dependability can be defined as the potential to
tolerate faults happening due to environmental features, leading to the possible
failure of the entire system. Misbehavior of the internal component of a system
which is known as fault can propagate until the output of the system and become an
error. Finally, if the generated error produced a misbehavior in the functionality of
the system, the system is facing a failure [3]. Therefore, strategies and techniques
are needed to tolerate faults and errors. In order to provide the most sufficient fault
tolerant techniques, faults and errors themselves need to analyzed and studied in
details. These faults and errors can be introduced both from the user side or the
surrounding environment. One of the main environment aspect that can reduce the
reliability of modern technologies specially when they are used in mission critical
application is radiation.
When a set of radiation particle interact within the electronic systems by an
exchange of energy, several kinds of effects can be observed. The impact of radiation
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effects on electronic devices can cause a misbehavior on the functionality of the
circuit. In order to apply strategies and techniques to tolerate these faults and errors,
these effects must be analyzed in detail. Considering high frequency and smaller
size of recent technologies, the sensitivity of High Performance Computing toward
radiation is expected to be higher. Therefore, having more resilient mitigation
technologies is more relevant and necessary, which is the focus of my research
activity.
Radiation-induced effects can lead different effects depending on the location and
time of the incident. If the effects of radiation incident last for a short period of time,
it is known as a transient fault. While if the effects last for a longer duration, it is
known as a permanent fault. Therefore, my PhD dissertation is divided into two main
parts. The first part as the main part is dedicated to the transient fault, mostly focusing
on Single Event Transient while the second part is dedicated to the permanent fault
such as Micro Single Event Latch-up and Total Ionizing Dose. Considering Single
Event Transient as the golden part of this dissertation, my research covers different
phases of this phenomenon from the generation until the mitigation. Chapter 1 of
this dissertation is dedicated to the elaboration of radiation effect on the modern
technologies while chapter 2 is dedicated to the basic mechanism of Single Event
Transient, evaluating the SET life-cycle inside the device. The thesis continues in
chapter 3 by developing environments and setups for performing characterizations of
SET pulses in different devices, development of tools and algorithms for analyzing
and predicting the behavior of SET in the effected device. The performed analysis
have been the golden keys to propose an efficient mitigation solution for robustness
of the developed system against this phenomenon elaborated in chapter 4. The
proposed mitigation solution has been known as the first method able to filter Single
Event Transient pulses with zero-timing overhead. These methodologies have been
applied to modern High Performance Computing technologies with high frequency
and smaller size which leads to more critical condition for Single Event Transient
effect.
This comprehensive proposed flow for analyzing and mitigating Single Event
Transient has been applied to several industrial projects such as EUCLID space
mission project with the goal of monitoring the dark space with the lunch planned
for 2020 carrying by European Space Agency which is the focus of chapter 5. The
developed SET analysis and mitigation work-flow has been part of the handbook
Space Product Assurance Techniques for Radiation Effects Mitigation in ASICs and
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FPGAs handbook, published by European Space Agency. Moreover, the developed
set of tools has been known as the Best EDA Tool for improving design automation for
integrated circuits and systems by IEEE Council on Electronic Design Automation.
However, as a part of my research activity, not only I focused on the Transient
effects, but I dedicated the second part of my dissertation to the evaluation of
permanent effects such as Single Event Latch-up and total Ionizing Dose. Chapter
6 focuses on Single Event Latch-up which is one of the major reliability concerns
for VLSI device applied in safety critical applications. The reduction of the circuit
feature size and operating voltage levels are leading to a new kind of latch-up
called micro Single Event Latch-up. Single Event Latch-up tends to occur near the
input/output terminals of logic gates while micro Single Event Latch-up may occur
at various locations between layers. One of the main research contributions of this
dissertation is to propose a first 3D model for describing the 3D physical layout
description of the design including the interconnection resources and logic versatile.
This 3D layout description leads to analyze the sensitivity of the sub-micron circuitry
to Micro Single Event Latch-up phenomena while considering the layout, depth, size
and density of the design. This methodology is considered as the first one applicable
to large industrial designs.
Bench-marking technologies are becoming increasingly attractive since their
configuration memory is almost immune to Single Event Upset. However, applied
in mission critical application, especially long-term missions, the FPGA devices
are subject to cumulative ionizing damage, known as Total Ionizing Dose. Total
Ionizing Dose may affect the FPGA, causing performance degradation and eventually
permanent damage. Therefore, chapter 7 is dedicated to propose a physical model
of Total Ionizing Dose effect in order to analyze the TID effect on recent modern
technologies.
1.1 Radiation characteristics
Radiation can be defined as a set of particles that are interacting within the device,
transferring their energy to the device and creating several effects. In space, there are
several kinds of radiation particles that can easily move in the space environment and
interact within the electronic devices, such as: energetic electrons, protons, alpha
particles, and heavy-ion particles [4] [5]. Some of these particles such as heavy ions
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have a really high energy which are able to overcome the package protection of the
chip and produce faults. While, other particles such as alfa particles are with lower
energy which reduce the probability of passing through the shielding of the device.
However, if these particles are generated inside the device as an interaction of high
energy particles with the silicon of the device, they are capable of producing faults.
When an electronic device is exposed to radiation, several kinds of effects can
be observed which is dependent to several factors. First of all, generated effects
depends on the feature of radiation environment and particles such as the energy of
the particle and the incident angel. On the other side, the triggered effects depends
on the material of the device that the particle is going though. Considering different
material, Linear Energy Transfer (LET) of the particle which is defined as the energy
of the particles transferred to the material is different. The LET value plays an
important roles in the computation of error rates for electronic system components.
In the studies of radiation effects on electronic devices, LET is usually expressed in
units of MeV cm2/mg of the material, typically silicon, which is representing the lost
energy of the particle to the material per unit path length (MeV cm2/cm) divided by
the density of the material mg/cm3.
Radiation induced faults can be classifies into two main groups: Single Event
Effects (SEEs) and Total Ionizing Does (TID). Single Event Effects are happening
due to the single particle strike in a certain location of the device. Based on the
incident location, electrical field and the energy of the incident particle, different
faulty behavior is expected. Theses faulty behavior could be temporary which means
that it is going to disappear after a while. These errors are known as Soft Errors. On
the other hand, if the faulty behavior is permanent by damaging the device itself, it is
known as Hard Errors. Considering the complexity of new technology and shrinking
of the device size, Single Event Transient as one of the main soft errors, has been
considered as one of the main critical soft errors while Single Event Latch-up is
known as one of the main recent hard errors.
Regarding Single Event Transient, when an electronic device is exposed to
radiation, the highly charged particles hit the device and interact within the material
of the device. The interaction of the ion with the pn junction of the active area of
the transistor can break temporally the barrier of the junction provoking a transient
pulse of the voltage in that junction which is called Single Event Transient (SET).
The SET shape depends not only on the incident but also on the device it strikes. In
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fact, it is a function of the LET of the particle and its incident angle, the material
encounter in its path inside the device and the electrical fields present at the particular
moment [6]. SETs are transient faults with the duration between picoseconds and
nanoseconds within the circuit, depending on the pulse width and amplitude. the
SET pulse can be generated inside a memory cell and if it presents enough amplitude
and duration, it can provoke a bit-flip in the memory cell. Also, SET can happen in
transistor of a combinational logic gate cell and be propagated by the circuit until
be captured by a memory cell or register. In both cases, bit-flip or SET capture,
the effect is an error in the circuit that may be a failure in the future if not masked
and leading to misbehavior of the system. Considering the high frequency of high
performance computing system, the probability of SET pulses being sampled in
drastically high which leads SETs to be a critical phenomenon for modern high
performance computing systems.
The effect of radiation particle interaction within the device is not always tran-
sient. In fact, some effects are considered as a permanent errors that are eliminating
just by restarting the device. As a sample of this kind of effects, Single Event
Latch-up (SEL) can be mentioned. SEL is happening due to the increasing of the
device current as a result of radiation incident. This phenomena usually leads to the
destruction of the device itself if not removed in time. The unique method to remove
SELs is powering off the device. Recently, due to the reduction of circuit feature size
and operating voltage level, a new kind of latch-up event called micro latch-up or
micro Single Event Latch-up is observed [7]. Usually, Single Event Latch-up tends
to occur near the input/output terminals of a logic gate where a charged particle
can pass through the silicon device region as a permanent effect. On the other side,
micro latch-up may occur at various locations across the die and between layers,
temporarily affecting the logical behavior of technology cells at various location
across the die provoking circuit misbehavior. Considering recent Ultra-scale devices
based on technologies below 20nm which are well known due to their elevated
computing features and low power consumption, these devices are more volunteer
for Micro-latch up effect.
Different from the Single Event Effects, total ionizing dose (TID) is the effect of
the accumulation of the charge injected by radiation. The accumulated charge is a
function of exposure time, the flux of the particles and the linear energy transfer (LET)
of the particles. TID causes three kinds of effects: performance degradation, increase
of the power consumption and programmability loss. Performance degradation leads
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to a slower device with reduction of maximum frequency while the increase of power
consumption leads to higher leakage current, increasing the power consumption
when transistors are not used. Eventually, the third effects leads to losing the
reprogrammability in the FPGA configuration memory.
Considering the critical affect of theses phenomenon, I dedicated my Ph.D
research activity to evaluate the effects of these phenomena to the functionality of
the system and providing methodologies to robust the circuit against these effects.
1.2 Modern VLSI Technologies
1.2.1 Field Programmable Gate Array
Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs) are becoming more and more commonly
used in various application fields due to their flexibility and low development cost.
Furthermore, with technology scaling, the computing power they can provide keeps
increasing while the cost and power consumption remains low. This makes them
even attractive in safety- and mission-critical fields such as automotive, avionics and
space applications.
The FPGA, by different manufacture process technology, can be divided into
SRAM-based FPGA, Flash-based FPGA and so on (Antifuse, EEPROM etc). SRAM-
based FPGA, such as the ones from Xilinx and Altera, provide large amount of
on-chip resources including Logic Blocks, Digital Signal Processing (DSP) Units,
On-chip Memory etc. Together with high performance, low power consumption
and high flexibility via partial reconfiguration, these features make SRAM-based
FPGA very popular in the market. While comparing to SRAM-based FPGA, Flash-
based FPGA does not require extra memory device to store configuration file, and
does not require to reprogram after each power-on, due to the non-volatile Flash-
based configuration memory. More importantly, the configuration memory inside
Flash-based FPGA are almost immune to permanent loss of configuration data.
Thus, Flash-based FPGA are gaining more and more interest in space and avionic
applications.
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Fig. 1.1 FPGA General Architecture
Though internal architectures may vary from device to device, the SRAM-based
FPGA and Flash-based FPGA share the same general architecture as shown in Figure
1.1 which includes Logic Blocks and Switch Boxes.
• The Logic Blocks typically contains resources such as Look Up Table (LUT),
Multiplexer and Registers that user can configure according to the logic circuit
ti be implemented and mapped on the FPGA. An example of Logic Block
(from Xilinx Virtex-5) is shown in Figure 1.2.
• The Switch Boxes usually contains interconnection segments which can be
configured as active or inactive as required by the routing of the implemented
circuit on FPGA. As example of routed design mapped on FPGA (ProASIC3
from Microsemi) is shown in Figure 1.3.
With other resources provided such as Block Memories, PLLs etc., designer
can create complicated system on FPGA using high level Hardware Description
Language (HDL) or High Level Synthesis methods supported by vendor tools. A
complete design flow usually includes several steps. The synthesis tool compiles the
design files in HDL or other high level design format to Gate-Level netlist, and then
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Fig. 1.2 Logic Block (SLICEL) diagram from Virtex-5 device of Xilinx
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Fig. 1.3 A routed design mapped on ProASIC3 from Microsemi
Place and Route tool is used to map the design to the hardware resources on FPGA.
In this process, the netlist could be used for different level simulation to validate
the design and timing correctness. Afterwards, the Post-Layout netlist is used by
Bitstream Generation tool to generate the bitstream file that can be downloaded to
FPGA for implement the design.
1.2.2 GPGPU
The Graphics Processing Units (GPUs) are special purpose processors devoted to
processing a large amount of data in a parallel fashion. Originally, this technology
was developed to accelerate image processing applications targeting multimedia
applications. Later on, this technology was adapted in other fields, such as High-
Performance Computing (HPC) for scientific applications, increasing the throughput
and performance. GPUs employed in these fields can be also known as General
Purpose Graphics Processing Units (GPGPUs).
GPGPU devices are able to execute multiple tasks concurrently. Internally, those
tasks are divided into multiple groups of processes (also known as Work-Groups,
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Fig. 1.4 Contemporary GPU architecture
Warps (Thread-Groups or Wavefronts) to be executed concurrently. The size of the
groups (32, 48 or 64 processes) depends on the granularity of the device technology.
In general, GPGPUs architecture is based on the Single Instruction-Multiple
Data (SIMD) computer taxonomy [? ]. This architecture employs multiple identical
processing units (or functional units) to perform the same operation on a group of
processes targeting different data operands as it is shown in Figure 1.4.
The structure of a modern processing unit (also called Streaming Multiprocessor
(SM)) includes an instruction cache memory, associated logic for instruction fetching,
decoding, one or more Work-group scheduler controllers and dispatcher units, a
register file, multiple integer and floating point units (also known as execution units
or CUDA cores), and special purpose accelerators such as modules devoted to matrix
calculations and transcendental operations.
Some manufacturers define the processing unit as combinations of two or multiple
SMs units. However, the basic operation of the system is the same. This operation is
controlled by the SM scheduler controller and it is in charge of starting the execution
of the SM by searching a work-group and dispatching to the SM.
The SM execution starts by searching and decoding an instruction from the
instruction cache memory. Then, each Work-group element (process or thread)
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search the data operands in memory followed by the operation on the execution units
(CUDA cores). Finally, results are stored in memory locations and a new instruction
is dispatched.
Nowadays, GPGPUs technologies are promising processing solutions in complex
and safety-critical applications, such as autonomous and semi-autonomous vehi-
cles. Moreover, those devices are designed and implemented employing aggressive
technology scaling approaches in order to fulfill performance and power constraints.
Nevertheless, it is well known that those integration technologies are more prone to
suffer from external effects such as radiation.
Part I
Single Event Transient

Chapter 2
Basic Mechanism of Single Event
Transient
Advanced digital circuits play an important role in a growing number of applications.
When used in mission critical application, digital circuits require a special attention
to the dependability aspect. In fact, one of the most critical environment aspect that
could lead to the failure of modern integrated technologies and systems is radiation.
Radiation effects on VLSI technology are provoked when radiation particles deposits
a charge. If the transited charge is enough to create a voltage glitch inside the circuit,
a spurious voltage glitch will be generated defined as Single Event Transient (SET).
Once the voltage glitch is generated, it may propagate through the circuit. If the
pulse reach to the storage element of the circuit and be captured by the storage
element,it may reach to the primary output of a circuit. Thus, provoking a functional
interruption. Moreover, considering the device technology shirking process makes
them more prone to be affected by a radiation particle. Likewise, considering the
increasing of the clock frequency of the recent complex design, the probability of
sampling SET pulse is growing. Therefore, the SET phenomena is becoming more
critical for recent technologies [8].
2.1 From radiation particle to voltage pulse
The Single Event Transient (SET) effects in nanoscale devices are usually the conse-
quences of charge particle strike [9]. When a highly charged particle interact with
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Fig. 2.1 Floating gate transistor layout in the 130 nm Flash-based FPGA and the correspon-
dent sensitive node generating transient pulses
the silicon junction of the device, the produced free mobile carriers are concentrated
within the depletion region of a p-n junction in one of the transistor sensitive nodes.
Therefore, the SET pulse will appear in the drain of the transistor because the ion-
ization can charge or discharge the active area. Figure 2.1 present a floating gate
transistor, however, the SET can happen in a regular transistor too.
As a result of the interaction of particle within the device, a voltage glitch is
generated known as Single Event Transient (SET). Moreover, the characteristics
of the generated SET pulse depends on several elements. To elaborate more, the
SET shape depends on several factors including the incident particle, the device
technology node it strikes, LET of the particles, the incident angle and the presented
electrical filed at the incident moment [6].
2.1.1 Basic mechanism of Single Event Transient
Transient errors are happening due to two major concerns: Firstly, if a storage
element junction is affected, it may cause a flipping of the original logic value of the
storage element, knowing as Single Event Upset (SEU). Under other condition, if
the particle hits a transistor as a part of combinational logic, it may generate SET
voltage pulse [10].The generated pulses have the duration between picosecond and
nanosecond. The typical pulse shapes generated by heavy ion particles are depicted
in Figure 2.2.
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Fig. 2.2 Examples of transient pulses generated by our electrical fault injection platform
and mimic heavy ions radiation particles hitting the sensitive nodes of a 130nm Flash-based
FPGAs
Under other condition, if the particle hits a transistor as a part of combinational
logic generating a SET, the pulse can propagate through routing and logic resources
in the circuit until it is captured by a sequential element, typically a Flip-Flop
(FF), causing a bit error. This error is propagating its effect during the circuit
execution [10].
2.1.2 SET life-cycle inside the device
When a sensitive node of a logic cell is hit by a highly charged particle, a voltage
glitch is generated inside the logic cell. The induced pulse may propagate through
the logic depending on the FPGA tile configuration. The pulse may directly cause a
SEU if the tile is configured to implement a latch or Flip-Flop. On the other hand,
if the tile is configured to implement a logic gate, in a condition that the voltage
amplitude of the induced pulse is more than Vdd/2, the pulse may propagate along
the path. During the propagation, depending on the type of the logic which the pulse
is propagating through, as an example inverting gates (INV, NAND, NOR,...) or
non-inverting logic gates (AND, OR), the features of the SET such as shape, width,
voltage amplitude and the propagation velocity may undergo different changes [11]
[12]. As a result, the pulse may either be masked due to other gate inputs along
the path or eventually reach a storage element, being captured by a storage element.
Then, the corrupt stored value leads to misbehavior of the implemented design.
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Fig. 2.3 Propagation of SET pulse through an Inverter with an input transition of 0-1-0
Several methods are dedicated to investigate the behavior of SET pulse prop-
agating inside the circuit implemented in the device [13]. The results of these
investigations show that SET pulse could be either filtered or broadened while
traversing different logic gates, which means that the characteristics of the pulse,
such as amplitude and width of the SET pulse, at the input of the storage element are
dependent on the number and type of gates along the propagation path. Figure 2.3
represents an example of a SET pulse traversing through an Inverter gate with a logic
transition of 0-1-0. In this figure, tpLH and tpHL are representing the propagation
delay of an Inverter as well as ∆t which shows the different between them.
As it can be observed, due to the delay unbalance at different circuit nodes(different
between propagation delays of tpLH and tpHL), the transient pulse is facing a broad-
ening or filtering effect, known as Propagation Pulse Broadening (PIPB) effect. To
elaborate more, if the delay for propagating the first transition is shorter than the
delay of propagation of the second transition, the SET pulse is broadened which
means that the duration of the SET pulse is increasing which increases the proba-
bility of SET pulse captured by storage element. On the other hand, if the delay for
propagating the second transition is shorter than the delay for propagating the first
transition, the SET pulse is attenuated which means the duration of the SET pulse
increases which reduce the possibility of sampling SET pulse by storage element.
Chapter 3
Analysis of Single Event Transient
The aggressive scaling trend in recent technologies makes Single Event Transient
(SET) one of the main critical faults within electronic circuits. The decreasing of
device and interconnect dimensions and reduction in the node capacitance of the
circuits leads to the generation of SET pulses even with a low energy particles.
On the other side, because of the high working frequency of recent circuits, the
probability of the generated SET pulses being catch by storage element is increasing.
Therefore, SET pulses are becoming more and more critical issues.
Considering recent technologies, two main FPGA families are the main interests
specially for space mission applications: Flash-based FPGAs and SRAM-based
FPGAs. Since the configuration memory cells of Flash-based FPGA are immune to
Single Event Upsets (SEUs) [14], SETs in user configurable resources are the major
source of soft-errors. As a result, several studies are dedicated to the characterization
of the behavior of SETs in Flash-based FPGAs. On the other side, SET behavior
in SRAM-based FPGAs is not studied in deep. Therefore, in order to provide a
comprehensive characterization of behavior of SET pulse in the recent FPGAs, we
focused on the both technologies, Flash-based FPGAs and SRAM-based FPGAs.
3.1 SET Characterization
In order to provide the comprehensive characterization of SET pulses in modern
technology, we focused on both Flash-based and SRAM- based FPGAs. As a first
step, for generating SET pulses, electrical injection method has been used in order
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to provide the complete control of the generated pulse parameters. The generated
pulse has been inserted in several circuits implemented on the FPGA in order to
evaluate the behavior of SET pulse propagating through different logic gates and
routing interconnections. The results have been provided by analysis the SET pulses
reaching to the output of the implemented circuits with respect to the generated
source SET pulse.
3.1.1 Electrical SET Injection
In order to emulate Single Event Transient Pulses generated by radiation particles,
there are thee main methodologies. The first one is radiation test. Radiation test is
providing the most realistic conditions with respect to the real radiation environment.
However, it is an expensive test. Moreover, it is not possible to control the parameters
of generated source SET neither the location of the radiation incident. Therefore, it
is providing the random incident which is close to reality but not sufficient enough
for analyzing the features of the SET pulse accurately. The second method is laser
test. Laser test is less expensive comparing to radiation test but still knows as an
expensive test methodology. Moreover, some specifications of the technology under
the study is required which is not always available. One sufficient and profitable
method to generate a voltage pulse is electrical injection [13]. As the benefits of
using this method, the possibility to control the parameters of the generated pulse
and also the location and time of injection of the pulse can be mentioned .
Electrical injection can be performed in two methods: External electrical injection
and internal electrical injection. The adoption of external electrical injection is
running down, since the distortion effects would affect the generate pulse traversing
the input ports. We choose internal electrical injection to generate SET pulses
internally. Therefore, we avoid the filtering effect of IOs structure which leads
to a better control of the pulse parameters. The logical scheme of internal pulse
injection generation is represented in Figure 3.1. Please notice that the proposed
logic scheme of internal injection is adopotable to both FPGAs and ASICs. However,
ASIC technology is out of the scope of the this dissertation.
The logical scheme includes "Inverter" and "AND" gates. The input of the
Inverter chain is connected to Signal Generator while the last cell of the Inverter
chain is connected to one of the "AND" input. The other input of the "AND" gate is
20 Analysis of Single Event Transient
Fig. 3.1 The developed logic scheme of internal injection generation
connected to the Signal Generator directly while the output of "AND" is connected
to the connected injection point internally. Due to difference of the delay between the
signals reaching to Inputs A and B of "AND" gate, the SET pulse will be generated
at the output of the "AND" Figure 3.1. The duration of the generated pulse as an
output of the "AND" gate is proportional to the delay of the number of Inverters used
in the chain. The longer is the Inverter chain, the wider is the SET pulse, represented
by Equation 3.1.
∆SET = ∆INV −∆Route (3.1)
3.1.2 SET propagation characterization
Several studies have been dedicated to analyze the characterization of radiation-
induced SETs in advanced digital circuits [15]. Most of them are focused at the
simulation level including technology-based physical equation for the evaluation
of the radiation incident and the propagation through the circuit [16]. A new
methodology for measuring the duration of the radiation-induced SET pulse is
introduced in [11] and [17]. However, the propagation of SET pulse has been studies
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Fig. 3.2 A Logic sensitive node and the two observability methods: towards next logic gates
and toward fan-out
only considering the delay of SET pulse propagating through the circuit and the
filtering and broadening of the pulse known as PIPB effect is not considered. Some
research works report the radiation test experiment of SET propagation on custom
circuits design for triggering and monitoring SET pulses [18]. These works show a
strong SET pulse width modulation when SET pulse is propagating through logic
gates and routing interconnections. Moreover, it has been observed that SET pulse
width at the input of the storage element is strongly dependent to the technology
under the study [11]. Therefore, it becomes mandatory to study and analyze the
behavior of SET pulse in different technology.
In this section, we move toward details of SET life-cycle inside the circuits
and propose an approach to evaluate it. The fundamental of this approach is the
fact that any kind of SET generated in sensitive nodes and propagated in different
position encounter different points. At any point of its logic gate traversing, the SET
propagation is dependent on two main factors: The logic gates in front of the pulse
starting from the sensitive point under the study and the fan out gates presents in a
give position during the pulse propagation, represented in Figure 3.2.
Considering that node A is the typical sensitive node of the implemented design
under the study, the SET pulse at this location experiences two different phenomena:
The first one is regarding the SET originated in a different position, propagated
thought the circuit and reaching to this node. The second is when the particle
incident occurs at this location and creates a SET pulse. Independently of the pulse
originated at this location or propagated up to here, the future life-cycle of SET pulse
at node A is dependent to two features: The logic gates in front of a the SET pulse
and the fan-out of node A. To elaborate more, SET pulse at node A faces a chain of
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Fig. 3.3 Scheme of internal electrical pulse generator
gates in front with different propagation behavior which is dependent to the type and
physical position of the logical gates of the used technology. Moreover, it observes
the fan-out connected to the node.
In order to evaluate the life-cycle of SET from its generation to the reach of a
destination point such as Flip-Flop or an I/O pin, we design a test setup. In this
setup, the SET pulse has been generated using internal electrical injection. The
generated SET has been propagated through the designed circuit. At the end, the
duration of the propagated pulse has been measured. Figure 3.3 represent the scheme
of this evaluation setup. This evaluation setup has been applied to two different
technologies: Flash-based and SRAM-based FPGA.
3.1.3 SET characterization test setup on Flash-based FPGAs
Flash-based FPGAs are known as the golden core for aerospace application. However,
when used in mission critical application, reliability of these devices requires a special
attention. Considering aerospace application, radiation particles such as neutrons,
protons or heavy ions can hit the sensitive region of the device which may be within
the layout layers of a gate or within routing segment of electrical buffers. As a result,
a voltage glitch will be generated which may reach the primary output of a circuit
causing a functional interruption, depending on different aspects:
1. Logical masking: the propagation of SET pulse may be halted due to the
logical behavior of a gate. Therefore, the SET pulse life terminates without
affecting the functionality of the gate or circuit.
3.1 SET Characterization 23
2. temporal masking: Presenting a scenario while the SET pulse is propagating
and reaching to the input of a Flip-flop but not in-time considering the se-
quential element latching window. Therefore, the SET life will be terminated
without being sampled by Flip-flops.
3. Electrical broadening: the SET pulse may go through some modifications
where the width and amplitude of the pulse is reduced and make it negligible.
Single Event Transient on Flash-based FPGA technology has been widely inves-
tigated with various methods starting from fault injection by simulation to radiation
testing. Several research activities focused on the characterization of radiation-
induced SETs in sequentional and combinational circuits [19]. Several studies have
been done at the simulation level, including technology-based physical equation for
the evaluation of the radiation strike and its propagation across the technological cell.
In [16], the propagation of the transient pulse through the combinational logic data
path and routing resources of Flash-based FPGA has been evaluated. New insight on
Flash-based FPGA is investigated in [20]. A new method for measuring the width of
radiation-induced transient faults is introduced in [11] and [17]. However, they are
not representing a realistic design. Because these methods evaluating the effect due
to the delay of SET pulse without considering the filtering and broadening effects.
Recent studies reported radiation test experiment and electrical fault injection of SET
propagation on custom circuits designed specifically to observe SET pulses [18].
Flash-based FPGA test setup
In order to evaluate the life-cycle of SET pulse, from the generation to the storage
element, we monitor the behavior of SET on Flash-based technology by configuring
different test setups while the SET pulse has been generated using internal electrical
injection.
Four types of test setups have been considered for the SET characterization with
respect to typical circuit design. The first scenario represents the combinational logic,
considering a chain of logic gates. For the second scenario, a fan-out has been added
to the logic chain. The third and fourth scenarios are representing a more detailed
cases where the existence of divergence and convergence of combinational node are
considered.
24 Analysis of Single Event Transient
Fig. 3.4 Logical scheme of the test- scenario 1
The test setups have been implemented on Microsemi ProASIC3 A3P250 Flash-
based FPGA. The results have been classified in terms of ratio between the output
SET pulse at the end of the chain while the source SET generated by internal injector
has been inserted at the start of the chain. In order to generate the SET pulse, a
pulse generator has been used which includes features such as : 330 MHz, selectable
pulse pattern modes and logic test clips. For measuring the pulse at the output of
the FPGA, an Oscilloscope equipped with high-impedance calibrated probes with
features of: Bandwidth of 100 MHz, 2 Channel, Sample rate on each channel equal
to 1.0 GS/s, input sensitivity range from 2mV to 5V/div and USB interface. Please
notice Oscilloscope has been used for measuring the SET pulse generated at the
output of the Internal electrical injection. For all the experiments, the source SET
pulse is considered equal to 3.5 ns.
First scenario: analysis of Inverter-string
The first scenario is dedicate to the characterization of the logical gates using internal
electrical injection for generated SET pulse. Therefore, we used Inverter gates as
logical gates while we used different length of Inverter-string. The logic scheme of
this scenario is presented in 3.4.
The SET has been generated using signal generator connected to internal electri-
cal injector. The generated SET pulse is connected to the first gate of the inverter
string internally while the SET reaching to the last gate in the chain has been moni-
tored.
The internal electrical injector had been implemented considering the fix place-
ment and routing characteristics. The same as the placement of the logical gates
which has been performed following the same distances between the logical gates
in order to guarantee the similar distance between the logic cells. This routing and
placement rules is shown is Figure 3.5.
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Fig. 3.5 An overview of the placement layout- Scenario 1
Fig. 3.6 Propagation Induced Pulse Broadening- Scenario 1 (Source SET = 3.5 ns)
As a first test setup, four designs with a set of 40, 60, 80 and 100 inverters in the
chain have been considered. This logic chain has been manually placed side by side
in the array with minimal distance connection between each VersaTile stage. Please
notice that the placement for internal injector components has been been fixed for all
the experiment. We inject SET in the first Inverter of the chain and we measure the
SET at the output of the chain. The results have been classified in terms of ration
between the width of output SET and the source generated SET pulse. This results
has been shown in Figure 3.6 . As it can be seen, by increasing the number of
Inverters in the chain, the PIPB value is increasing until it reaches a saturation point.
Moreover, we also measure the delay between the source SET and the output SET
pulse. As it can be observed i n Figure 3.7 , the delay in increasingly linearly with
respect to the number of Inverters used in the chain.
Second scenario: analysis of Inverter-string and fan-out of Inverters
The goal of the second scenario is to evaluate the effect of fan-out on SET propagation
behavior. Therefore, the second scenario is an extension of the first one considering
the inclusion of various logic gates as fan-out. The fan-out has been connected to the
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Fig. 3.7 Inverter chain delay- Scenario 1
Fig. 3.8 Logical scheme of the test- Scenario 2
beginning of the chain where the output of the internal injector is connected while
the SET in the output of the chain has been monitored. Figure 3.8 represents the
logic scheme of the second scenario.
The same as Scenario 1, the design of place and route of the fan-out follows the
minimal distance routing between each VersaTile. This placement design is fixed
for all the performed experiment for the second scenarios which has been shown in
Figure 3.9
Please notice that the output of each fan-out is tied to the output pin. Therefore,
it will not be simplified with the design tool and this output pins has been fixed for
all the tests.
In order to implement the second scenario, we extended the first setup by adding
different number of 20, 40 and 60 Inverter gates as fan-out connected to the different
number of 40, 60, 80 and 100 Inverters. For each combination of Inverter string and
fan-out, the result related to the PIPB effect has been denoted in Figure 3.10. As it
can be observed, by increasing the length of the Inverter string, the PIPB increased
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Fig. 3.9 An overview of the placement layout- Scenario 2
Fig. 3.10 Propagation Induced Pulse Broadening(PIPB)- Scenario 2 (Source SET = 3.5 ns)
which verifies the result of the scenario 1. More importantly, it can be observed that
the PIBP is progressively attenuated by increasing the fan-out for a fixed number of
Inverters as a chain.
More interestingly, considering the delay of the circuit, we measured the delay
between the delay of the input SET and the output SET. It has been observed that for
fixed number of Inverters in the chain, by increasing the number of Inverters in the
load, the delay of the circuit is not increasing and it is fixed, represented in Figure
3.11.
Therefore, considering fan-out as the filtering architecture, it is possible to modify
and decrease the PIPB value without introducing a delay for the circuit.
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Fig. 3.11 Inverter chain delay- Scenario 2
Fig. 3.12 Logical scheme of full adder by SET in the divergence point
Third scenario: analysis of chain divergence
As a next scenario, we considered the conditions of typical logical designs and
behavior of SET while there is an occurrence of divergence of combinatioanl paths.
Considering the typical full adder structure represented in Figure 3.12, when there
is an occurrence of SET pulse in the divergence point, independent from the fact that
SET pulse has been generated in the divergence point or propagated up to this point,
the SET pulse spreads through divergence point and propagate through secondary
logic string and reach to the storage elements connected to the affected string.
In order to evaluate this condition, the second scenario has been modified to
mimic the SET characterization in the divergence node. In the new test setup, we
create a divergence node in the middle of the main string and adding the second string
to this divergence node. The internal injector has been connected to the input of the
main Inverter string while the SET at the output of both paths have been monitored.
The same as previous test setups, the placement and routing of the implemented
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Fig. 3.13 Conceptual scheme- third scenario
Fig. 3.14 PIPB report- third scenario (Source SET = 3.5 ns)
design has been controlled totally and tied to the same placement for all the tests.
The scheme of the third scenario has been presented in Figure 3.13
In order to study the behavior of SET in the divergence point of the implemented
design, the length of the main string has been fixed as 60 Inverters and different
number of 60, 80 and 100 Inverters have been tied to the secondary string and the
fan-out has been considered as 60 Inverters. The propagated SET pulses reaching to
the end of the main string (First output) and the secondary string (Second output)
have been monitored and measured. Figure 3.14 reports the PIPB value while Figure
3.15 reports the delay value.
Fourth scenario: analysis of chain convergence
The fourth scenario is dedicated to the condition when the SET traverses through
divergence point, propagate through different logical paths and routing, reaching
to the convergence point of the circuit. Figure 3.16 represents this condition in full
adder logical scheme.
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Fig. 3.15 Delay report- third scenario
Fig. 3.16 Logical scheme of full adder affected by SET in the convergence point
In order to mimic this phenomenon, we modify the previous scenario, adding
a convergence node to the test design. Figure 3.17 shows the logical scheme of
the design. The input of the design is connected to the Signal Generator while the
generated SET goes through divergence node, multiplying in two and propagating
through two paths of A and B. The propagated SETs reach to the convergence point
and merge together. The SET reaching to the convergence point in monitored in
order to characterize its propagation exclusively. Please take in to consideration that
the placement and routing of the electrical injection, string and fan-out have been
fixed.
In order to analyze the behavior of the SETs while it has been multiplied into
two SETs through divergence point of the design, propagated and reached to the
convergence point, we consider a string of 20, 40 and 60 Inverters and fan-out of
20, 40 and 60 Inverter gate. The SET has been injected at the start of the string and
SET propagated through two designed paths. The first one is a string of Invetrers
while the second one consists of only routing segment. The SET pulse reaching to
the convergence point has been observed.
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Fig. 3.17 Conceptual scheme- fourth scenario
Fig. 3.18 PIPB report- fourth scenario (Source SET = 3.5 ns)
Figure 3.18 presents the obtained results regarding obtained PIPB while Figure
3.19 reports the delay of the circuit. The results shows that the respective counterpart
only marginally influences the PIPBs of two strings.
Moreover, due to merging and overlapping of the two propagated pulses at the
Convergence point, a new phenomenon is observed. Due to this phenomenon, two
results can be observed. The first one happens when there is a large difference on
the propagation delay of the two separate pulses, represented in Figure 3.20(a). The
second happens when the difference between the delay of the two paths is small, a
converged SET can be observed which is characterized by an extremely large width,
Figure 3.20(b). This phenomenon is explained in details in the following sections.
3.1.4 SET characterization test setup on SRAM-based FPGAs
When applying FPGA to mission critical application used in space environment, two
main families are considered: Flash-based FPGA and SRAM-based FPGA. Due
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Fig. 3.19 Delay report- fourth scenario
Fig. 3.20 An example of SET propagated through two convergence paths and generating:
two independent SET pulse (a) and C-SET pulse (b)
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to the fact that configuration memory cells of Flash-based FPGAs are essentially
immune to Single Event Upsets (SEUs) [21] , SETs in configurable resources
are the major concern of soft errors. Therefore, life-cycle of SET in Flash-based
FPGA has been studies several times while the SET pulse is SRAM-based FPGAs
has not been investigated widely. In [14], a new methodology for generation and
measurement of SET has been proposed. SET pulses propagating through different
logic chain have been studied while the method is not tested in realistic circuits.
Moreover, this methodology did not cover a comprehensive characterization of
SET through the circuit since it was not applying an internal injection method
able to generate a transient pulse. Therefore, we used internal electrical injection
capable of generating SET pulses at various amplitude and width within the SRAM-
based FPGA. Moreover, the measuring methodology has been applied which allows
measuring of the propagation pulse shape with respect to different input pulse
width for any type of logic function implemented on SRAM-based FPGA LUT.
The methodology has been applied to circuits implemented on SRAM-based FPGA
in order to confirm the efficiency of the developed work flow for providing the
comprehensive characterization of SET on SRAM-based FPGA.
The same as Flash-based FPGA, internal electrical injection has been used
to generate SET pulses internally in SRAM-based FPGA, Figure 3.1. Therefore,
controlling the width of generated SET pulse is acquired by changing the number
of Inverters or constraints the placement of the gates involved in the internal SET
generator.
Characterization analysis test
In order to evaluate the life-cycle of SET pulse, starting from the injection point to
the storage element or output of the circuit, different test setups have been designed.
For these test setups, different logic gates with has been considered while the SETs
with different pulse duration have been generated. The test setups have been designed
with respect to typical circuits. Therefore, different combinational logics such as
INV, AND, NAND, OR, XOR and XNOR have been considered for generating chain
of logic gates. The output of internal electrical injection has been connected to the
beginning of the chains configured with different logic gates. The SET pulse is
propagating through the chain and at the end of the chain, the propagated SET pulse
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Fig. 3.21 Overview of the global analysis methodology for SRAM-based FPGAs
is monitored. The logic scheme of the generated test setup is observed in Figure
3.21.
An automatic methodology for measuring output SET and PIPB coefficient has
been developed, which process the generated pulse, measures the propagated pulse
width and computes the PIPB coefficient for different gates. This procedure is
repeated until the error rate is lower than a threshold which is defined by users. For
calculating the PIPB coefficient, Monte Carlo approach is applied while the number
of iteration has been sets to maximum of 10K iterations. As a reference error, we
used the standard signal-error lower than 10−5.
Please note that the placement and routing of the chains composed of different
types of gates in each configuration has been controlled strictly in order to guarantee
the same distance between each cells and this the same delay on the routing paths
in order to calculate the PIPB coefficient value for each individual gate of different
types with the information regarding the injected SET pulse and the captured SET
pulse at the end of the chain.
Capture and monitor of SET Pulse
In order to measure the width of the SET pulse reaching to the end of the chain, two
methodology can be applied. The first one is using measurement equipment such as
oscilloscope for measurement of the width of the pulse, as it has been used for Flash-
based FPGA setup. The second method is to apply the the internal measurement
3.1 SET Characterization 35
Fig. 3.22 Scheme of the SET pulse measurement circuit
setup such as internal filter based measurement methodology which provides an
accurate measurement of pulse duration.
The filter based measurement circuit is composed of an array of SET filtering
blocks where each block is in charge of filtering SET pulses within certain range.
Figure 3.22 represents the logical scheme of the filtering block.
This methodology works based on the difference between routing delay of path
A and routing delay of path B. The SET pulse that has been generated with internal
electrical measurement is propagated through the developed chain of logic gates
and reaching to the input of the measuring block. The SET pulse at the input of
the measuring block will propagate through both path A and B. If the difference of
routing delay between path A and B is less that the duration of SET pulse, the pulse
propagates through the AND gate and sampled by the latch, presented in Figure
3.22, a. On the other hand, if the different of the routing delay is more than the width
of the pulse, the pulse is filtered and the latch output remain the same, as shown in
Figure 3.22, b.
By tuning the difference of the delay for each filtering block in an array of such
similar blocks, the width of SET pulse can be monitored through decoding the output
values of all the latches.
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Experimental setup on SRAM-based FPGA
Xilinx KC705 development board adopting a Xilinx-7 SRAM-based FPGAs has
been used to evaluate the SET behavior of 28nm technology. As a primary step, a
simulation environment has been developed. The simulation environment is used
for simulating different chains of gates, while injecting SET pulses at the input
and observing the output SET pulses. For the simulation environment, the focus is
on the timing analysis in order to confirm the necessity of using SET injection for
performing characterization on SRAM-based FPGA.
As a second step, Xilinx Vivado Design implementation tool is used to develop
chains of different gates of INV, AND, NAND, OR, XOR and XNOR. Please note
that the concept of Gate is not introduced in SRAM-based FPGA. Instead, Look Up
Tables(LUT) are considered to perform the required functions. We inject SET pulses
with different widths at the input of the chain using internal electrical injection and
measured SET pulses at the end of the chain. The results has been reported in terms
of ratio between the SET measured at the end of the chain and the injected SET at
the start of the chain knows as PIPB coefficient.
Simulation results
A simulation environment is used to assess the necessity of using SET pulse injection
and measurement for evaluating PIPB effect on SRAM-based FPGAs. The result
confirmed that SET pulse reaching to the end of the chain is facing a propagation
delay which is dependent to the length of the chain. Moreover, the width of the SET
pulse is equal to the injected one at the start of the chain and it is not affected by
broadening or filtering effect. Figure 3.23 represents the simulation result related
to a chain of 100 INVs while the SET pulse of 0.2 ns has been injected at the start
of the chain and the pulse with the same width has been observed at the end of the
chain with the propagation delay. Therefore, it can be concluded that the commercial
simulation tools are not accurate for providing information regarding the behavior
of SET propagation in chain of gates. Therefore, developing a work flow is for
evaluating the behavior of SET pulse is necessary.
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Fig. 3.23 Simulation results for injecting SET of 0.2 ns to a chain of 100 INVs
Table 3.1 Generated SET using internal electrical injection.
Pulse Generator Pulse Width[ns]
Pulse 1 0.4
Pulse 2 0.8
Pulse 3 1.0
Pulse 4 1.2
Pulse 5 1.4
Pulse 6 1.8
Pulse 7 2.0
Pulse 8 2.2
Test setup
Internal electrical injection is used to generate SET pulse. We generate eight different
SETs by changing the placement and routing of the SET injector itself. Therefore,
we introduce different path delays while the number of used inverters are fixed as
three. Table 3.1 reports the widths of the generated SET pulses.
Different test setup including Chain of 100 INV, AND, NAND, OR, XOR and
XNOR logic gates have been developed. The generated SET has been connected to
the beginning of the chain while the measurement block is connected to the end of
the chain. Moreover, no other gate is connected to the chain to avoid any possible
distortion during measurement and analysis.
In order to overcome the logical masking of the generated pulse, for the logics
with more than one input, the other inputs are all set to unmasked condition such as
AND and OR gates. For example, the second input of AND gates in connected to
1, OR gate is set to 0 and NAND gate is set to 0 while for XOR and XNOT, both
condition of setting the second input to 0 and 1 have been implemented.
Considering the described SET injector and the measurement block, the widths
of SET pulses at the end of each chain have been monitored. The measurement block
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Fig. 3.24 Propagation pulse broadening for inverting gates- each chain includes 100 gates
Fig. 3.25 Propagation pulse broadening for non-inverting gates
composed of 32 filtering blocks which is capable of measuring SET pulses with the
duration from 200 ps to 6.4 ns with a resolution of 200 ps.
Figure 3.24 represents the results regarding PIPB coefficient for the inverting
gates (gates that produce opposite logic value). As it can be observed in the figure,
by increasing the width of SET, the PIPB coefficient is progressively attenuated and
measured PIPB coefficients for all tested inverting gates are less than 2.
Regarding Non-inverting gates, different behavior is observed. In fact, the results
shows that Non-inverting gates show higher sensitivity comparing to inverting gates.
Considering Figure 3.25, the PIPB coefficient can reach to 6 for narrow SET pulses,
much higher than PIPB of inverting gates. However, when the width of SET pulse
increases, the PIPB coefficient decreased drastically.
3.1 SET Characterization 39
Table 3.2 Benchmark area utilization.
Circuit FF[#] LUT[#] MUXFX[#] CARRY[#] IO[#]
B11 30 108 2 10 15
B12 119 279 8 0 13
B13 51 55 0 0 22
B14 218 2350 50 268 88
Table 3.3 Benchmark critical path resources.
Circuit Inverting gate[#] Non-Inverting gate[#]
B11 4 16
B12 8 4
B13 8 2
B14 32 28
Real test case
Four circuits from ITC’99 benchmark collection have been chosen [22]. The are
utilization are reported in Table 3.2.
These four circuits have been implemented on Xilinx KC705 board with the
working frequency of 40MHz. For avoiding the erroneous measurement happening
due to insertion of the pulse injection infrastructure, the timing and placement
constrains has been fixed. Therefore, the implementation tool does not modify the
delay characteristics of the logic paths.
For each benchmark, the most critical path regarding timing is selected. Table
3.3 reports the characteristics of the selected path. The eight generated SETs are
injected to the first LUT of the critical path while the measuring circuits have been
connected to the last LUT of the path.
As it has been shown in Figure 3.26, in circuit B11, by increasing the generated
source SET, the PIPB value reduces drastically because the number of non-inverting
logics is more than inverting logics. On the other side, for circuit B13, since there
are few inverting gates, the PIPB value is not going through the variability due to the
PIPB coefficient saturation cause by inverting gates. However, the longer is the path,
the higher is the PIPB coefficient as it is expected. It means that the SET pulse will
be broadened more when propagating along the path. The measurement error of the
PIPB value has been estimated less than 5%.
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Fig. 3.26 Propagation pulse broadening for circuit benchmarks implemented on SRAM-based
FPGAs
As a summary, SET characterization on SRAM-based FPGA is evaluated. In-
ternal electrical injection is used for generating SET pulses while propagated SET
pulse is measured using an array of filtering blocks.
3.1.5 Research advancements on SET characterization
In order to provide an accurate analysis of SET behavior propagating through
the design implemented in different technologies, a behavior of SET pulse in the
technology under the study is required. Therefore, a comprehensive characterization
of SET pulses is mandatory. Internal electrical injection is used to generate a SET
pulse internally and several tests setups have been developed for evaluating the
behavior of SET pulse propagating. The test setups are implemented on two main
categories of FPGAs: ProASIC3 Flash-based FPGAs and Xilinx KC705 as SRAM-
based FPGAs. As a result, a comprehensive behavior of SET propagating through
the design is provided including the evaluation of PIPB effect which is a mandatory
step for performing an accurate SET analysis.
3.2 On the prediction of SETs
In order to apply an efficient mitigation solution to the circuits under exposure, as a
first step, it is mandatory to predict the radiation-induced SET phenomena within
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the silicon structure of FPGA devices. Some studies have been dedicated to this
phenomenon.
In [23], an analytical method for the modeling of SETs has been provided.
However, this method is mainly based on the probabilistic calculation of the transient
pulse effect which does not represent the correlation of the generated SET pulse with
the Linear Energy Transfer (LET) of the radiation particles. Therefore, we propose
an effective methodology for prediction of SET phenomena and correlating the type
and LET of radiation particles with the generated SET pulses [24]. Thanks to the
experimental radiation test that we performed with Heavy-ion particles [25], we
developed an environment for evaluating and predicting the generated SET pulses.
3.2.1 SET physical dynamic simulation model
The developed platform is based on two analytical models. As a first step, the
approach is starting with SET generation models for generating the source SET
voltage pulse considering the linear energy transfer of the particle generating SET
pulse. The second step is dedicated to physical dynamic model. This model is
applied to define the propagation behavior of the voltage pulse applied at the input
of the gate, dynamically.
SET generation
The incident particle has a scattering path during its penetration in the material,
presented in Figure 3.27.
If the energy of the particle is high enough, it can traverse through the material
and generate a spurious voltage glitch inside the device. During the interaction of
the particle within the device, the radiation particle is transmitting its energy to the
device. The dynamic energy of a particular particle incident on a material is defined
as its energy loss per unit path length of penetration into the material itself. This
correlation has been shown in equation 3.2.
DynLET =−dE/ds (3.2)
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Fig. 3.27 An example of dynamic LET form on a generic empty layout in 2D and 3D .
DynLET is defined as the particle incremental energy (dE) loss per incremental
distance (ds) traversed in the material. The SET generation mathematical model is
correlating the energy of the particle that has been transmitted to the silicon and the
maximal depth where the energy has been reached. The overall correlation between
the LET and the SET voltage pulse is represented by equation 3.3.
∆Vpulse(GAT E) = kgate× (tpLH − tpHL)
tpHL =
tSET
DynLET
(3.3)
tpHL and tpLH are the propagation behavior of the related gates while ∆vpulse is
representing the maximum amplitude of the generated voltage pulse by radiation
particles. It is necessary to mention that the maximum voltage pulse is dependent
to the transmitted LET and the material which it deposits the energy. This effect
has been represented by kgate coefficient. The dynamic behavior of the developed
model is expressed by the ratio between the static time of the SET pulse (tSET )
divided by the dynamic LET shape and it is calculated by means of a modeled
dissipation function created according to each gate layout. An example of dynamic
LET calculation has been represented in Figure 3.27, which has been computed
base on the radiation particle trajectory, position of the radiation particle and layout
topology of the cell. Therefore, the shape of SET pulse analytically depends on the
cell sensitive points and from the energy and position of the radiation particle.
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SET propagation behavior
After Generation of SET pulse with respect to LET, the propagation of generated
SET pulse has been investigated. Based on the physical dynamic model, the behavior
of the pulse with the transition of 0-1-0 has been described. In this description,
the transient pulse broadening of a node is computed as the difference between the
propagation delays which is defined as tpLH for an output transition from logical
"0" to a logical "1" and tpHL represents to a high to low output transition [26]. The
propagation delay is measured between 50%of the transition points of the input and
output waveform modeled by the following equation3.4.
∆tp = tpLH − tpHL
i f (tSET > (k+3)tpHL)→ tout = tSET +∆tp
(3.4)
Please note that the coefficients of the propagation delays of tpHL and tpLH are
computed by a linear interpolation of the experimental characterization that we
performed in [25]. It is known that each gates has different propagation behavior
related to the difference between the propagation delays of tpHL and tpLH which the
transient pulse broadening and filtering at a node is dependent to these values.
For performing the characterization, we used two modules: a signal generator
and a scope. The signal generator is an Agilent 811101A-M2 330 MHZ. This
generator has been used in order to apply pulses at different frequencies and with
different voltages. The scope is a LeCroy WaveRunner 44Xi model equipped with
high-impedance calibrated probes and able to measure voltage transients larger than
200 ps with a time resolution of about 90 ps. The probes have been connected to the
device under the evaluation to measure voltage and width of the generated transient
pulses and the pulses that have been propagated through inverter logic gates.
For characterization of SET behavior, we developed an environment consisting
of 5652 chains of inverters. The developed environment leads to observe the effect
of the voltage glitch traveling from the injected point at the start of the chain trough
Flip-Flops. Considering the number of inverter gates (5652), the source SET duration
and measured pulse duration at the end of the chain represented in Table 3.5. while
tpHL and tpLH has been calculated for each SET pulse, represented in Table 3.4.
Please notice that the SET pulses have been selected in a way that it is possible
to physically perform an electrical injection analysis. In order to inject SET pulses,
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Table 3.4 tpHL and tpLH for each Inverter
tpHL[ns] tpLH[ns]
2.793 2.791
1.763 1.761
1.188 1.186
0.605 0.603
0.466 0.464
0.354 0.352
0.354 0.26575
0.214 0.216
0.192 0.198
Table 3.5 Propagation behavior
Input Pulse[ns] Output Pulse[ns]
19.57 26.83
12.35 18.68
8.33 16.69
4.25 12.383
3.34 12.461
2.49 12.588
1.89 12.324
1.35 12.251
0.84 12.132
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Fig. 3.28 The flow of the developed SET prediction method
a methodology based on internal electrical pulse injection has been used. This
methodology leads to an accurate characterization of the SET propagation within
the logic and routing resources of Flash-based FPGA [13]. The internal electrical
pulse generator designed to create a SET pulse, leads to a better control of a SET
parameters comparing to external injection. internal electrical injection has been
explained in details in the following sections.
3.2.2 SET prediction methodology
The main core of the proposed approach is based on the prediction of the source SET
in order to imitate the radiation particles strike condition with the random location
and energy. Figure 3.28 represents the developed environment which consists of a
Monte Carlo simulation block that is applicable to all kind of circuits implemented
on Flash-based FPGA.
The flow starts with the generation of the SET pulse. Based on the LET, the SET
generation model is creating an appropriate random SET pulse, applied to random
location of Flash-based FPGA circuit. Fault injection phase is dedicated to inject
generated SET pulses and propagate the generated SET through the circuit output
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Fig. 3.29 The flow of the developed SET prediction method
where the SETs are classified. As the next phase, the MonteCarlo flow has been
applied to the environment.
MonteCarlo is a computational algorithm that is based on a repeated random
sampling to obtain reliable numerical results. This methods is performed in three
phases: The first phase is dedicated to generating simulation data. Following by
performing some statistical procedures and recording the results. After repeating the
results for multiple times and reaching to different results, the variability between
the results has been calculated. This variability is called MonteCarlo Error (MCE),
the extent to which difference occur across simulation depends on the setting on the
MCE. The MonteCarlo executes until acquired MCE reaches the chosen by the user.
Therefore, we developed a tool which the pseudo code has been shown in Figure
3.29.
The developed tool starts with the estimated propagation behavior of tpLH and
tpHL. The flow continues with with selecting randomly the SET pulse duration
and location of injection. As a next phase, the tool continues with analysis of SET
propagation through different paths of circuit with respect to SET analytical model
and classifies the SET reached to the storage element. This classification has been
3.2 On the prediction of SETs 47
Fig. 3.30 Global scheme of the generated test setup.
compared to the experimental results and this comparison has been used to define
MCE. This algorithm has been repeated to reach the selected value for the MCE.
3.2.3 Prediction of SET on Flash-based FPGAs
In order to confirm the proposed environment, a circuit consisting 5652 inverter
chain has been desinged and implemented on A3P250 ProASIC3 Flash-based FPGA.
The experimental results is provided applying an empirical approach comparing the
prediction model with radiation test campaigns data.
The radiation experiments have been performed at UCL facility of Louvain-la-
neuve. The details of the performed experimental radiation test is reported in [25].
The developed benchmark has been under the beam for two LET value: Ag107 ion
beam having LET 54.7 MeV cm
2
mg and Ni58 ion beam with the LET of 28.4 MeV
cm2
mg .
These tests have been performed on three different devices specifically provided
by Microsemi. All the three devices have been preliminary evaluated checking
the correct operative functions at the testing frequencies of 50 and 100 MHz. The
propagated SET pulses have been monitored at the output of the implemented setup.
The logical scheme of the generated test setup is observed in Figure 3.30 while the
scheme of the SET pulse measurement is represented in Figure 3.31.
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Fig. 3.31 Scheme of the SET pulse measurement circuit.
The SETs are categorized in three different groups related to the monitoring
design system. The groups are coherent between the experiments as presented in
Figure 3.32, 3.33 and 3.34.
We applied the MonteCarlo methodology to the benchmark circuits with three
different standard error deviation values: 10%, 1% and 0.1%. The output SETs have
been classified according to the intervals used to monitor SET during the radiation
test experiments, represented in Figure 3.32, 3.33 and 3.34.
The results acquired by the proposed prediction model shows the SET pulses
with the duration of 0.45 ns and 0.48 ns. This SET length predicted by the simulation
model are closely matches with the radiation experiment result which leads to the
verification for the proposed prediction methodology.
Considering the error-bar, all the classifications are comparable with an overall of
about ±4.5% with the MonteCarlo approach applied with a standard error deviation
of 10%. Moreover, with respect to standard error deviation at 1%, the overall error
is about ±0.2%. Reducing to zero to match the prediction considering the standard
error deviation of 0.1%, leading to a progressive precision of the proposed method.
3.2.4 Research advancement on the prediction of SETs
In order to perform an accurate analysis and mitigation of SET pulses, one of the
golden steps is identifying the characteristics of the source generated SET pulse
within the silicon structure of devices. The generated pulse is dependent on several
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Fig. 3.32 Comparison between the SET prediction model and the heavy-ion test results.
Standard error deviation at 10%.
Fig. 3.33 Comparison between the SET prediction model and the heavy-ion test results.
Standard error deviation at 1%.
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Fig. 3.34 Comparison between the SET prediction model and the heavy-ion test results.
Standard error deviation at 0.1%.
parameters such as the radiation profile, the type of the existing particle, incident
angel and the technology under the study. Therefore, a model has been developed
which takes into account the mentioned parameters and provide the characteristics
and the duration of the expected pulse.
As a conclusion, a novel Single Event Transient prediction model has been
proposed which leads to the effective identification of SET phenomena and correlates
the radiation particle energy and the type of transient effect. With respect to the
experimental result acquired from heavy-ion particles, the proposed method has been
validated.
3.3 Single Event Transient Analyzer - SETA
After the generation of SET pulse, the generated pulse may propagate through the
routing and logic resources of the circuit that it may reach and be captured by a
storage element such as Flip-Flops(FFs). The SET sampled by a FFs may corrupt
the previously stored values, causing a bit-flip which in turn can propagate and leads
to misbehavior of the system. Therefore, it is mandatory to evaluate and analysis
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the SET phenomena [27]. Several studies have been dedicated to the evaluation
of SET propagation using electrical simulation [28]. Even though these methods
are effective for analyzing the propagation of SET pulses, they do not evaluate the
broadening or filtering effect of the SET pulses traversing logic and routing resources
knowing as Pulse Induced Propagation Broadening (PIPB) [29]. In addition, those
approaches are time consuming. Therefore, not sufficient enough to be applied to
an industrial design flow with enormous amount of resources. Among the studies
available using FPGA technologies, FPGAs with Flash-based configuration cells are
mainly addressed since their configuration memory cells are essentially immune to
bit-flips. Therefore, SETs in the Flash-based FPGAs logic and routing resources are
the major concern regarding soft errors. Many studies have focused on identifying the
type of generated SET within the silicon structure of Flash-based FPGA with respect
to the SET behavior of sequential and combination circuits [20] [30] [31]. This
evaluation of SET effect on the logic and routing structure are used for verification
of the efficiency of the SET mitigation based on electrical filtering [32]. Radiation
test experiment and electrical fault injection of SET propagation of custom circuits
designed specifically to observe SETs have been reported [31].
3.3.1 SET behavior in combinational logic
In order to analyze the sensitivity of a FPGA regarding SET event, an elaboration
of FPGA architecture is required which is based on the behavior of SET pulse
propagating through routing and logics of the implemented design. Therefore, an
accurate modeling of SET phenomena induced by radiation particles within the
silicon structure of the nanometer devices is required. During this modelization, one
of the main goal is to focus on the PIPB effect. Please notice that SPICE is not able
to simulate the broadening or filtering effect of the pulse propagated through the
logic. Therefore, Matlab environment is used to provide the physical evaluation of
this effect. To do so, several features of the design are required such as: Technology
information, thickness, area, resistance and capacitance of interconnection and device
layers.
As a primary phase of SET model, according to the characterization provided
in [33], SET pulse is generated. This formulation is reported in equation 3.5 where
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Fig. 3.35 The device routing topology of the Microsemi ProASIC3 family.
τn is the duration of the transient pulse .
1.i f (τn < kτp)→ τn+1 = 0
2.i f (τn > (k+3)tp)→ τn+1 = τn+∆tp
3.i f ((k+1)tp < τn < (k+3)tp)→ τn+1 =
τ2n − r2p
τn
4.i f (ktp < τn < (k+1)tp)→ τn+1 = (k+1)tp(1− e(k−(τn/τp))+∆tp
(3.5)
This mathematical model has been developed by Matlab environment in order to
model the generated SET pulse propagating through the logic gates.
3.3.2 SET behavior in routing interconnections
The developed routing model is mainly based on an accurate calculation of the
propagation delay of the routing system. In order to do this, the routing segments
has been classified in four groups: extra array long line which are the longest
interconnections, intra array long lines for long connections through the whole device,
medium lines and short lines for local routing resources. Figure 3.35, represents
routing structures.
For considering the effect of the routing on the whole circuit, we extracted the
coordinate of the logic functions. Using these coordinates, it is possible to know the
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Table 3.6 Routing topology organization on ProASIC3 devices
Kind Delay[ns] Distance[♯]
Short 0.8 1
Medium 1.01 2
Intra long 1.265 6
Extra long 1.239 12
number and kind of segments used between two logic functions. By calculating the
propagation delay of routing segments, we are able to assign the propagation delay
to the related kind of routing. In Table 3.6, the data obtained from the ProASIC3
Microsemi device family. Considering the routing structure in this family, it is
possible to analyze the routing effect on SET propagation on the whole device.
3.3.3 Integration of SETA with commercial tools
In order to evaluate the effect of SET on the functionality of the circuit implemented
on Flash-based FPGA, we developed a CAD methodology which is able to evaluate
not only the propagation of the SET pulse, but also the possible pulse propagation
cased and the PIPB effects on industrial circuit with enormous resource usage
implemented on Flash-based FPGAs [34]. The developed CAD tool, named SETA
is interfacing with the commercial FPGA design flow providing an SET sensitivity
analysis of the implemented design.
To elaborate more, the goal of the proposed CAD tool is to provide an effective
methodology for analysis of SET sensitivity taking into account different SET
propagation scenarios. SETA is integrated with the standard FPGA design flow, as
the flow is illustrated in Figure 3.36.
The developed tool is starting from the hardware description of the design (HDL),
going through netlist synthesis, mapping and place and route. Using the commercial
tool, we generate the post-layout netlist along with the Physical Design Constraint
(PDC) file which consists the information regarding placement of the implemented
design. The developed SETA tool starts from elaborating the post-layout netlist
and Physical Design Constraint file of the design to perform the SET analysis.
For performing the SET analysis, SETA evaluates the pulse propagation behavior
through the routing and logic resources of the design in order to generate the SET
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Fig. 3.36 The developed analysis flow for the accurate evaluation of SET effects on SoC
implemented on Flash-based FPGA.
sensitivity. To elaborate more, SETA reports all Gate-to-Gate PIPB coefficient during
the propagation of SET pulses.
SET Analyzer
To evaluate the SET sensitivity of the circuit implemented on Flash-based FPGA,
SETA works in two phases: 1. generation of SET pulses 2. elaborating the physical
description of the design.
As a first phase, SETA generates the SET pulses and inject the generated SET
pulses in all the logic resources of the circuit. In order to do this, user should set the
parameters such as voltage amplitude and pulse width. Based on this parameters,
SETA generates a list of SET pulses. Each pulses is described using 100,000 voltage
sample point, allowing a precision of 1 ps.
After the generation of SET pulse, SETA starts elaborating the PDC file containing
placement information of the logic resources used in the circuit. This information
together with the logic information extracted from from post-layout netlist have been
used to generate a Physical Design Description (PDD) file for extracting and storing
the elaborated circuit where I/O pins, Flip-Flops, RAM or ROM ports are considered
as terminal nodes connected through routing segments.
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Fig. 3.37 The SET propagation approach: a voltage vector PGi is transformed in a new
vector PGi+1, considering the gate Gi, the subsequent gate Gi+1 and the routing segment
between two logic gates.
As it has been mentioned before, there are four different types of routing seg-
ments: Extra array long lines; intra array long lines; medium lines and short
lines [30].
The generated SET pulses of the first phase are injected at each single intermedi-
ate node of the design and propagated until a terminal node. During this propagation,
based on the type of gates and routing interconnection stored in PDD file, PIPB
coefficient is calculated. At the end, SETA tool reports the SET sensitivity for each
terminal node, in terms of final PIPB coefficient and probability of SET causing
bit-flip.
Considering the calculation of PIPB, SETA describes the voltage glitch as an array
P of real types values. Considering a scenario where a voltage glitch is propagated
from the logic element Gi to a subsequent logic element Gi+1, the SETA tool uses an
array PGi to describe the voltage transition at the input of the gate Gi and an array
PGi+1 to describe the new voltage array which is generated after the propagation
from Gi to Gi+1. This concept is explained in Figure 3.37.
The computation of the SET pulse propagation is the golden feature of the
proposed algorithm. During this computation, a set of parameters were stored in a
device library including the port delay, the routing delay and the Manhattan distance
of each pair of source and destination gate. The mentioned delay is calculated with
respect to the resistive and capacitive load for each VersaTile input as sum of the
fan-in and fan-out contributions of the logic cells. These parameters are described as
PIPB factor coefficient represented in Figure 3.38. The algorithm is following some
steps for calculating the PIPB factor:
1. Given the pulse width PW1 at the source gate(Gi)
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Fig. 3.38 The main core of the Propagation Induced Pulse Broadening (PIPB) calculation
for the involved gates gate Gi and the following gate Gi+1 (red X is representing the worst
condition while green x is representing the best condition).
2. Identification of the destination(Gi+1)
3. Calculation of the sum between the best and the worst propagation condition
defined as PIPBBEST and PIPBWORST of the two considered gates Gi and
Gi+1.
Equation 3.6 is representing the mentioned calculation. The best and worst
conditions are corresponding to the timing behavior of the gate couple calculated
respectively as follows: best condition under low temperature, high voltage and fast
process corner; worst case under high temperature, low voltage and slow process
corner. For both of the gates, the PIPB factor have been calculated. Each PIPB is
obtained by interpolating the gate PIPB characteristics with the input pulse width
calculated based on the input pulse vector PGi. The final ΣPIPB used to reshape the
pulse described by the output pulse vector PGi+1 is the sum of contributions of two
gates.
PIPBBEST = PIPBBEST−Gi+PIPBBEST−Gi+1
PIPBWORST = PIPBWROST−Gi+PIPBWORST−Gi+1
(3.6)
In order to identify the effective behavior of SET pulse broadening or filtering
while propagating through the routing and logics, we imitate the plot of the PIPB
coefficient in Figure 3.39. Please note that the worst and best conditions are described
by specular behavior of the ΣPIPB. Moreover, the decreasing or increasing of the
wire length which is defined as number of wire segments between the two considered
gates is acting strongly on the values of the PIPB but not on the intrinsic gate BIBP
behavior. Indeed, an extremely large or low number of wire length saturates the PIPB
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Fig. 3.39 Representation of the cumulative (KPIPB) on a generic couple of gates considered
in a pulse traversing computation(red X is representing the worst condition while green x is
representing the best condition).
Table 3.7 Characteristic of the original benchmark circuits
Circuits Versatile[#] FFs[#] Frequency[MHz]
B05 415 66 47
B09 493 67 46
B12 565 123 48
B13 162 50 52
CORDIC 956 240 45
RISC 1,401 1,156 42
characteristics. Moreover, as it can be observed, the size of the versatile, specially the
number of internal resources programmed by the versatile logic element is affecting
the final PIPB effect.
3.3.4 SETA on Flash-based FPGAs
The proposed environment has been applied to circuits implemented on A3P250
Flash-based FPGA manufacture by Microsemi with 6,144 logic versatiles. We select
circuits with different complexity: four circuits from the ITC99 benchmark collection
[22], a Cordic core and a RISC microprocessor. The characteristics of the circuits
are reported in Table 3.7. For each circuit, the number of Versatile used as logic
function or Flip-Flop and the maximum working frequency is reported.
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Table 3.8 Sensitivity report of the selected circuits for injection of 5000 SET pulses lower
than 1 ns
Circuits logical masked[#] filtered[#] partially filtered[#] broadened[#]
B05 46 9 3 8
B09 47 3 6 11
B12 102 1 7 13
B13 21 14 8 7
CORDIC 161 12 28 39
RISC 572 204 184 196
We analyzed the circuits SET sensitivity using the developed tool. Microsemi
Libero SoC commercial design tool has been used for generating the inputs required
for the developed environment such as PDC and post layout netlist. For our ex-
periment, we consider SET sources as SET pulses with the duration less than 1ns
(0.3, 0.6 and 0.8 ns) since these SET pulses are knows as the most probable events
generated by heavy ions striking the Flash-based FPGA 130nm technology [35].
As an output of the developed tool(SETA), the condition of each Flip-Flop with
respect to the propagated SET pulse is reported:
• Logical masked is representing the Flip-Flops which are facing the SET pulses
that have been filtered by circuit logical masking.
• Filtered is dedicated to the Flip-Flops which are facing the pulses that are
electrically filtered during their propagation.
• Partially filtered is the case of the Flip-Flops that are facing the SET pulses
which the duration of the pulses decreased before reaching to the Flip-Flops.
• Broadened is representing the case of the Flip-Flops which are facing pulses
with broadened duration.
Table 3.8 is reporting the sensitivity analysis of the mentioned circuits using
SETA tool while we inject 5,000 SETs for each circuits.
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3.4 Evaluation of Transient Errors in GPGPUs
General Purpose Graphic Processing Units (GPGPUs) are high-performance oriented
devices designed to execute stream processing computations providing high com-
putational power combined with an overall low design cost thanks to their flexible
development platform. The parallelism capabilities of GPGPUs leads them to be a
suitable option to be adopted in mission-critical applications including automotive,
avionics, space and bio-medical fields [36]. For example advanced driver assistance
system (ADAS) applied to cars and it is largely based on the usage of images or
radar signals coming from external camera and sensor devices to detect possible
obstacles triggering the breaking system. On the other side, considering the space
application, European Space agency (ESA) is applying low power GPGPUs for im-
ages compression on the COROT satellite [37]. Therefore, the required bandwidth
for sending the data is minimized. Moreover, the Airbus avionic company within the
framework of the ARAMIS project integrates all the electronic used to deploy the
Collision Avoidance System (CAD) into a single board including a GPGPU core [38].
High degree of parallelism as the main feature of GPGPUs, makes it highly easy to
implement in software trasition soft error mitigation methods such as Duplication
With Comparison (DWC) and Triple Modular Redundancy (TMR). However, the di-
mension of these software, their component organization and their complexity make
them sensible to soft errors [39] [40]. Moreover, while many soft-errors hardening
methodologies already exist for system based on traditional CPUs, solutions and
evaluations for GPGPUs are still under investigation and development [41].
Different methods such as fault injection is adopted for evaluating the transient
errors sensitivity of GPGPUs. Fault injection is a commonly adopted solution for
validating the final application code and check its detection and correction with
respect to transient errors. Fault injections methods can be categorized in two
groups: The first one is to expose the GPGPUs to accelerated radiation beams. The
second is resorting to transient errors injection using a simulation-based software
method. One of the main restriction of the developed method is elevated economical
costs of experimental radiation beam and the excessive intrusiveness combined with
ineffective fault models of simulation-based approaches.
Preliminary activities have been performed through radiation test experiments
where the GPGPUs operation is executed with the device being irradiated by a
neutron radiation source with energy above 10 MeV. Neutron particles may generate
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transient errors which cause silent faults or functional interrupts. These methods
are applied to test software-based hardening strategies avoiding the propagation
of soft-errors [41]. Several studies present the application of the Error Correction
Code (ECC) mechanism in the most common applications in the High Performance
Computing (HPC) and safety-critical domain [42] [43].
Fault injection by emulation has been recently developed in [44] [45]. These
methods are based on the NVIDIA CUDA debugger(gdb) which by means of ad-
hoc software infrastructure is injecting transient faults in the accessible memory
components to mimic faults affecting ALUs and FPUs and classifying their effects.
These methodologies are characterized by the advantage of using a real device
for transient error characterization in order to evaluate the behavior of transient errors
and its realistic propagation behavior within the physical architecture of GPGPU.
However, it has two main disadvantages: firstly, the computational speed of GPGPI
under the test is really low due to the debugger interface. Therefore, it nullifies
the benefit of the emulation; secondly, debugger interfaces have limited resource
accessibility. Therefore, the fault injection is limited only on specific variables and
memory elements of the architecture without any possibility of emulaing transient
effects affecting GPGPU combinational resources.
Many GPGPU simulators are developed based on the Instruction Set Architecture
(ISA) and hardware architecture model. [46] represents the Barra GPGPU simulator
which is based on UNISIM framework and allows the Parallelization of the Thread
eXecution (PTX) and the execution simulation of CUDA programs at the functional
level. Moreover, the simulator can be customized reusing the module libraries and
feature proposed in the UNISM repository and it allows the integration into the
NVISIA OpenCL software stach.
The performance of GPU simulation has been evaluated in [47] by simulating
NVIDIA parallel thread execution with non-graphics applications, decreased threads
and characterizing the performance differences when different DRAM locality al-
gorithm are adopted. In [48], a new simulator, GPGPU-sim, is developed which
uses different benchmark application [49] in order to explore efficient mechanism
in Single-Instruction Multiple-Data (SIMD) branch execution on GPUs. Using
GPGPU-sim, users are allowed to have a detailed model of the commercial GPGPU
such as Fermi and FT200. The model includes the specification of the streaming-
multiprocessor architecture, the existence and the size of the caches level L1 and
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L2 as well as the shared memory architecture and size. The architectural simulator
GPGPU-sim offers the flexibility to modify the processor parameters and allows the
integration of customized modules.
Moreover, the GPGPU-sim has been used in occurrence to hardware emulation
for the execution of fault-injection analysis [50]. However, this method has the
limitation of analyzing transient errors affecting axclusively variables and registers
used by the tested applications without the possibility to analyze the effects of faults
generated in the internal logic structure [51].
We propose a simulation-based fault injection methods which provides solutions
for disadvantages of the state-of-the-art and providing novel insight on the behavior
of GPGPUs when affected by transient errors. In this simulation environment, we
inject transient errors within the gate level model of a GPGPU device and evaluate its
consequences on the executed application. Please notice that using this environment,
as accurate GPGPU fault model is provided which allows to propagate transient errors
from the affected location to the registers involved in the computation, modeling
the transient error propagation. Therefore, it is possible to determine the right
influence of the error in the GPGPU architecture. Moreover, the low intrusiveness
of the proposed approach can be mentioned specially when a software application
is evaluated. During this analysis, Streaming Processors (SPs) are the main focus.
These units are the elementary units where arithmetic and logic computations are
executed. Therefore, a SP is one of the most critical components of GPGPUs
computing because an error may affect the execution code, the operands or the
results thus compromising the whole algorithm execution.
3.4.1 The proposed environment
The proposed environment is represented in Figure 3.40. The first steps of applying
this method is availability of the hardware model (VHDL) and the Instruction Set
Architecture (ISA)of the considered GPGPU. The fault injection method includes
two steps: The first step is the injection of the transient errors while the second is
the GPGPU application simulation execution with the injected fault. As the first
step, transient errors is injected in the hardware architecture model of the GPGPU
under test. For generating the transient error, we considered the worst case scenario.
It means that SET pulses are generated without considering the logical and timing
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Fig. 3.40 The flow of the developed simulation-based fault injection for transient errors
analysis on GPGPUs.
masking. After the generation of the pulse, the pulse is propagated and stored in the
GPGPU affected register list. The second phase goes on with the execution of the
hardware application using GPGPU-sim framework, which has been instrumented
with the injection of errors that simulates the radiation effects in a realistic way. The
injection has been performed with respect to the timing analysis and clock cycle. To
elaborate more, GPGPU affected register list is used to perform the error injection
and simulating the effective propagation of the original transient pulse to the GPGPU
computation. At the end, the result of each fault injection is classified.
Architecture level transient error injection
The main goal of architectural level transient error is to simulate the Single Event
Transient (SET) or transient error phenomena generated by radiation particles inter-
acting within the silicon structure of the GPGPU device. Therefore, a description of
GPGPU structure is required. To do so, as a preliminary phase, extracting the archi-
tectural graph description is performed. A software tool is elaborating the GPGPU
netlist and translating it into a Physical Design Description (PDD) file containing a
directed graph representation of the circuit where each vertex models a logic gate or
sequential element while edges model the interconnection between them.
The transient error injection module is performed in the following steps: the gen-
eration of the SET pulse modeling as a transient pulse shape, the localization of the
combinational gates within the circuit description and execution of the propagation
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of the SET pulse starting from the selected sensitive node of the GPGPU circuit and
traversing logic gates and routing interconnections until a storage element.
For generating the SET pulse, we developed a model for elaborating the phys-
ical layout description. The first phase generates the SET model with respect to
the definition represented in Equation 3.7. The second phase is dedicated to the
propagation with respect to the basis of the resistive and capacitive load calculated
on the hardware technology model of the circuit. The propagation coefficient is used
in the model described in Equation 3.7 in order to generate the expected propagation
coefficients for all the logic paths. Due to the difference between propagation delays
of tpHL and tpLH , the propagation behavior of SET pulse is defined. tpLH stands for
an output transition from logical 0 to logical 1. tpHL refers to high to low output
transition and ∆tp represents the difference between them. Tn represents the duration
of the transient pulse at the nth logic state and tp is equal to the tpHL for a one to zero
to one transition at the nth node or equal to tpHL for a one to zero transition and k is
a filtering parameter which depends on the technology of interest.
1.i f (τn < kτp)→ τn+1 = 0
2.i f (τn > (k+3)tp)→ τn+1 = τn+∆tp
3.i f ((k+1)tp < τn < (k+3)tp)→ τn+1 =
τ2n − r2p
τn
4.i f (ktp < τn < (k+1)tp)→ τn+1 = (k+1)tp(1− e(k−(τn/τp))+∆tp
(3.7)
The architectural level transient error injection is executed for all the desired
number of injected SETs. The generated outcome consists in a database of SET pulse
events observed in all the GPGPU registers that will be selected for simulation-based
fault injection. The golden benefit of transient injector module is individuating the
effective propagation of the SET on the computational registers which leads to a
more accurate fault injection execution of the GPGPU soft error simulation.
GPGPU soft error simulator injection
The main advantages of architectural simulator is providing a robust solution for
verification of the efficiency and application performance through the detailed models
of the most used commercial devices. In our work, we used the GPGPU-sim [45]
due to the flexibility for developing a soft error injection that simulates the radiation
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Fig. 3.41 GPGPU-sim modeled system.
effect realistically. The overall model of the GPGPU architecture in represented in
Figure 3.41.
We modified the GPGPU-sim simulator to perform dynamic fault insertion in the
thread executed by the GPGPU. Thread are scheduled in the groups of maximum 32
threads knows as warps. Simulation executes GPGPU kernel and warps sequentially.
By accessing to the global memory, it is possible to extract the information related
to the execution timing. Due to the thread class interface, we can obtain all the
information to identify each thread execution in the simulator and the hardware
associated to it. A fault free execution allows the extraction of the execution timing
information of an application. Therefore, we can know all the instruction executed
by simulator and identify the correspondent instruction registers and computational
operands registers.
Figure 3.42 represent the scheme of the soft-error injection tool integration in
the GPGPU-sim.
We implement a fault injector module for injecting in a specific fault inside an
executed instruction. This module runs the applications of two distinct operational
modes: 1. Golden response mode: refers to fault free execution. Therefore, at the
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Fig. 3.42 Soft-error injection tool integration in the GPGPU-sim simulator.
output, it provides a profiling file including a list of all the instructions executed
with information of the warp and thread in a specific execution time. 2. Fault
simulation mode: for injecting a fault inside an instruction. For every fault generated
a description of the fault is obtained.
The fault injection module operations can be managed through the usage of a
configuration file. It allows to enable the fault injection module. Consequently, using
the fault list, it selects the instruction in which the injection has to be performed.
Every fault is identified from the following parameters:
1. Instruction name: the type of instruction affected from the injection.
2. Warp identification: identify if the fault affects a specific warp or all the warps.
3. Kernel identification: Identify if the fault affects a specific kernel or all the
kernels.
4. Bit mask: it is a 32=bit integer representing the mask applied to the operands
in order to invoke bit-flip. Each not-masked bit correspond to the relative
injected soft-errors.
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Fig. 3.43 Soft-error injection tool integration in the GPGPU-sim simulator.
Test execution flow
The complete flow of the test execution is represented in Figure 3.43. The fault
injection environment is mainly based on the integration of the architectural level
transient injector and the GPGPU soft error simulator. The number of injected
transient faults together with the number of parallel processes should be defined
by the user. The injection rate is calculated with respect to the GPGPU affected
register list automatically. Obviously, the simulation duration is dependent directly
to the number of required simulation and the complexity of the application. As a first
step of the test execution, compilation and building the application on the simulator
is performed. Once this step is done, the golden response mode is set and a first
execution of the application is performed. As a result, the execution timing data of
the kernel and warps are extracted which leads to the complete set of instructions
and golden response of the applications and is used to create an accurate timing fault
list.
While the main program runs the application, the fault injection is performed
and the injector module is checking the execution continuously in order to inject
the error in the instructions and register defined in the GPGPU affected register list.
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Once the injection time is gained, the GPGPU affected register list is used to identify
which bit within the affected registers are flipped. As the end of the simulation, a
log file is generated. In this log file, the executed instructions during the application,
the information on the faults injected and the final results are reported. As an output,
there is a report which is providing the number of affected simulation which can be
classified as follows:
1. Silent simulation: defined as simulations that have not been affected by the
fault injection and the results are equal to the golden one.
2. Timed out simulations: simulation which face a functional interruption due to
the time threshold.
3. Corrupted simulations: simulations without reporting a functional interruption.
However, the results are different from the expected one.
3.4.2 Fault tolerance design methods on GPGPU
Time redundancy and space redundancy techniques are the common methods applied
to safety critical applications. In a case of a GPGPU, when the software code is
implementing a function, the function can be executed twice and then results are
compared. To elaborate more, the functions can be executed twice in two different
threads on two different cores, having a form of Duplication With Comparison
(DWC) in space. Applications can also execute the function three times on three
different cores and choose the result with a voting technique which is known as
TMR. However, these methods are not applicable to the faults in the control units that
may cause the function interruption. However, the main goal is to apply concurrent
execution of the CUDA kernels or CUDA functions on different CUDA cores.
Matrix product: plain and fault tolerance algorithm
The pseudo-code of the developed algorithm for matrix multiplication is shown in
Figure 3.44. The sizes of the matrices A, B and C are not mentioned in the algorithm.
However, respectively, they are m*n, n*p, m*p. Routines at rows 6 through 10
execute the block transfer from the matrices A and B allocated in the device RAM to
the shared memory. In this phase, every thread only copies one element of the matrix
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A and one element of matrix B, in case indexes are within the range of the matrices.
Otherwise, it only initialized the corresponding elements in the share memory to zero.
On the other hand, from row 21 to 24 the multiplication is executed to compute the
element corresponding to the thread index. The value resulting from this operation
is accumulated in the variable valC. At the end, from row 27 to 30, the end of the
block iteration and the assignment of the final value to matrix C is reported.
To elaborate more, the number of accesses to an element A[i,j] or B[i,j] from
the GPU main memory is equivalent to [m/b] and [p/b], because every block of A
is accessed every time a C result block is computed lying in the same row, while
every block B is accessed every time a C result block is computer lying on the same
column. The number of accesses in the share memory, per element, is equal to
[m/b]*b for the elements of A and [p/b]*b for the elements of B because we access
the elements b times within the block multiplications, and there are [m/b] block
multiplications involving every block of A and [p/b] block multiplications involving
every block of B.
The developed matrix algorithm requires some extra access with respect to the
version without dividing the multiplication in blocks and using the shared memory.
However, comparing to the computing of the product directly, the implementation of-
fers a time advantages. The algorithm was executed on matrices size of n*1024*1024
starting from n=1 and doubling it every time, considering a running frequency of
1058MHz with a memory transfer rate of 2500MHz, it is possible to get a drastic
improvement on performance as it is presented in Figure 3.45. However, as the main
advantages of this method it can be mentioned that it is limited to multiply matrices
whose result C has a number of elements not greater than maximum number of
threads instantiated on the GPGPUs, as a thread only computes one element of the C
matrix. Although, it is normally enough for most of the real world problems.
We choose three different matrix product algorithms: Duplication With Com-
parison (DWC), Tripe Modular Redundancy (TMR) and Algorithm Based Fault
Tolerance (ABFT).
The DWC implementation is executed twice on two distinct output buffers as
explained in algorithm represented in Figure 3.44. A second kernel compares the
two results and if they do not match, an error is detected. In one way, the result
is recomputed one time on a third output buffer and the value which appears two
times are returned. Therefore, we can have three buffers allocated in case of error.
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Fig. 3.44 The matrix multiplication kernel algorithm.
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Fig. 3.45 Matrix product implementation comparison with and without using the shared
memory. The developed algorithm is using the shared memory thus getting an improvement
in performances.
In addition, it is necessary to copy the right result from its buffer to the final output
buffer if they are different. In the development solution, we recomputed the product
two times until they agree. In such a way, we use two buffers for the output instead
of three, but it is possible to have a bigger time penalty in case of error. Figure 3.46
is representing the pseudo code of the algorithm developed for DWC. The two calls
to MATMUL of row 6 and 7 can be executed on different CUDA cores, so that, if
the hardware has enough resources enables, they can be executed in parallel. Despite
of the simplicity of the DWC solution, it is expensive in terms of memory and time,
especially in case of error.
Another method to handle faults is the modulation of the computation and check
for errors at module level. Therefore, the algorithm recomputes only the corrupted
module. To elaborate more, based on the Triple Modular Redundancy (TMR), the
algorithm computes every block of C two times and perform a comparison.The
code to compute a block has been put in a device function that is called by the
kernel multiple times. The function returns the value of the element of the block
corresponding to the thread. The kernel stored the two values in a local variable. As
a result, the additional required memory consists on the remaining part of the stack
of the running threads. After double computing of an element, every thread will
compare them. If the result is different, a shared variable is automatically set which
is used to signal an error to the whole block. Then, the threads need to synchronize
in order to read the signaling variable. in such a case that the variable is set because
an error has been detected, the value of the element for each thread is computed a
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Fig. 3.46 The algorithm of matrix multiplication with DWC.
third tome and the most frequent result is stored in the result buffer. Therefor, we do
not need to synchronize the thread anymore. The comparison of the voting system is
done per element. As a result, every thread can perform it autonomously. Figure 3.47
is representing the pseudo code of the function computing the single element of a
block.
At the end, the algorithm represented in Figure 3.44 has been extended in to a
larger buffer order to acquire the ABFT implementation of matrix multiplication.
We implemented a solution by maintaining the additional rows and columns
used as check-sums in separate buffers and read from or write to these buffers when
needed. In such a way, only 2*m+2*p additional floats registers are needed and
no copy operation is required, adopting the buffer scheme as in it presented in
Figure 3.48. To elaborate more, In order to compute row of A or the check-sum
column of B, we can do a sequential reduction optimizing the time complexity, since
the computation is performed in very separated thread.
Fast Fourier transform: plain and fault tolerance algorithm
The implementation of the FFT relies on the Cooley-Tukey algorithm and it can
be formulated by the butterfly network in which every two samples of iteration are
given by the two samples of the previous iteration in the same position. A buffer in
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Fig. 3.47 The algorithm of Matrix Multiplication with TMR-kernel.
Fig. 3.48 Additional buffers scheme needed for the check-sums for the matrix product ABFT
method.
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Fig. 3.49 Scheme of the shuffle operation on the FF network to the auxiliary network done in
the global memory buffers
Fig. 3.50 FFT host algorithm executed on the share memory
the global memory is required. Therefore, every thread can read a couple of samples
and generate the new couple of samples that replace them.
In used method is based on arranging the samples in blocks properly and operat-
ing them separately. There are N samples in the buffer at each computational step.
Therefore, the read and write operations in the global memory are N*log2 N. In a
case that the input signal size is more than the shared memory allocated for each
block, the usage of the shared memory faces problems. In fact, if a write operation is
executed on different portions of the signal storage in the shared memory of separated
blocks, at some point a thread will need to access the sample stored in the shared
memory to two different blocks. In order to overcome this problem, we shuffled
the samples in the global memory every N*log2 B step operations performed in the
shared memory. The shuffle operation is not symmetric. Thus, the operation cannot
be performed in a parallel way but can be performed during the load of the samples
from the buffer of the global memory to the shares memory, realizing the scheme
presented in Figure 3.49. Figure 3.50 and 3.51 are representing the pseudo-code of
the algorithm developed for FFT.
The performance of the FT algorithm has been executed on a GeForce GT750M
having 384 CUDA cores running at frequency of 1058MHz and with a memory
transfer rate of 2500MHz. We set the size of the shared memory per block to 4096
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Fig. 3.51 FFT propagation kernel algorithm executed on the shared memory
Fig. 3.52 The comparison of the FFT implementation with and without using the shared
memory.
complex numbers. While the size of the input data is ranging from 1024*1024 to
8192*1024 by doubling the first dimension once at a time. Figure 3.52 is representing
the acquired results. In both of the implementations, the increase of the time linearly
with the size of the input in noticeable. It should be mentioned that the version using
the shared memory is always faster and the slope is less comparing to the version
without applying shared memory.
In order to obtain the right results, traditional FFT fault tolerance implementation
involves full recomputation. In a case of an FFT elaboration on a long signal, if error
happens, the time penalty will be extremely long. In order to overcome this issue, we
applied a checkpoint scheme in a way that every n steps, we check the intermediate
results for errors. In a case of no error, the intermediate results are stored in the
global memory and compute the next n steps. Differently, we restart the computation
of the last n steps from the last checkpoint. Considering the fact that ABFT based
algorithm is a general technique to detect and correct errors, we have to encode in
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Fig. 3.53 The check-pointing scheme adopted integrating the ABFT algorithm.
Fig. 3.54 The FFT algorithm with the ABFT mean based check pointing.
advance all the sub-signals in a bottom-up order. TO elaborate more, firstly, encoding
of the signal corresponding to the last decoding is performed. Secondly, encoding
the sub-signals corresponding to the second signal subset values is performed. Every
time that the encoding is done, we need to shuffle the sub-signals into a smaller
group and encode each time we reach a size of the sub-signal corresponding to the
size of the checkpoint lever. The scheme is shown in Figure 3.53 while Figure 3.54
is reporting the pseudo code of the developed algorithm.
76 Analysis of Single Event Transient
Fig. 3.55 Comparison of the execution times of the Sobel operator implemented in Frequency
(blue line) and in space (red line).
Sobel operator: plain and fault tolerance algorithm
Sobel Operator is a filter that is mainly adopted in image processing and computer
vision. The filter allows to compute different transfer functions Hx from Gx and
Hy and Gy, then transforming the signal back and combined according to the main
transfer operator. In a mathematical point of view, the Sobel operator is applied to
two kernel matrices with the size of 3*3 known as convolution matrices of the original
source image matrix. Two methods are considered for evaluating the performance of
the algorithm: frequency and space. We plot the results in Figure 3.55 with respect
to average of 10 executions with a size of signals of n*1024*1024 while n has a
range from 1 to 8. The implementation with the direct computational gradient is
used for the fault injection analysis since it is much faster with respect to the version
with the transformation.
The Sobel operator implemented directly in the space domain, just consists in
approximating the gradient in each point by differentiating. It is expected that a
single soft error in the logic of the ALU is not affecting all the samples but just
one sample of the output because the computation of each sample is independent
from the other samples of the transformed signal. By using a DWC scheme, we
can identify the corrupted sample and recompute it. If the error occurs in memory,
multiple samples could be affected. In particular, all the samples of the output close
to the corrupted sample in the input. In such a case, the most convenient way is to
recompute the whole output. The DWC implementation of the fault tolerance of
the Soble operator is straightforward and the remaining non linear operation can
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be protected from soft errors using a TMR approach. From the implementation
standpoint, this algorithm needs the computation of the Sobel operator to be divided
into three distinct operations each one with its independent fault tolerant computation.
3.4.3 Experimental results
The developed fault injection technique is applied to NVISIA G80 GPGPU model
architecture [52] while using the hardware description of the FlexGrip GPGPU [53].
This hardware description is directly implementing the Hardware Description Lan-
guage of NVIDIA G80 GPGPU. The proposed fault injection method has been
applied to Streaming Multiprocessor(SM) architecture which includes a five-stage
pipelines architecture consisting Fetch, Decode, Read, Execute and Write stages,
supporting the execution of 27 CUDA instructions.
We used Microsemi ProASIC gate library [54]for synthesis of the SM model.
We performed two kinds of analysis. Firstly, we evaluate the sensitivity of a single
streaming processor regarding transient error. Secondly, we execute various fault
injection campaigns on the benchmark applications including Matrix multiplications,
FFT ans Sobel filter. For both the standard plain algorithm and applying mitigation
strategies such as DWC, TMR and ABFT.
Streaming processor transient error injection
By synthesizing the SM architecture using Mircosemi ProASIC, a netlist of more than
50K gates organized in about 1.5 M logical paths is generated. In order to perform a
realistic evaluation of transient errors, we choose a single streaming processor, which
includes around 4K gates and registers organized in 238K logical paths and mapped
on ProASIC3 Flash-based FPGAs [55]. For evaluating the sensitivity regarding SET,
we considered eight different types of SET pulses ranging from 100 ps to 1 ns. We
inject randomly 1000 errors for each type of pulses. The results has been classified
in four groups: filtered, partially filtered, equal and broadened SETs. Figure 3.57
is reporting the obtained results. It can be noticed that most of the SET pulses with
duration less than 0.45ns are filtered. Moreover, by increasing the width of the pulse,
the number of unfiltered and broadened pulses increase. However, it is possible to
observe that for the SETs with width more than 0.7ns, all the pulses are broadened.
78 Analysis of Single Event Transient
Fig. 3.56 An example of loical cone outputs.
Therefore, all of them are reaching to their respective logical cone outputs. Figure
3.56 represent an example of logical cone considered for evaluation of SET pulses.
Moreover, we investigate the number of computational registers reached by the
injection of each SET pulse. It has been observed that the SET pulses are facing
a broadening of their width ranging from 5% to 10% of their original width. The
transient error profiles acquired by the error injection have been stored into the
GPGPU affected register list.
Application fault injection results
Different applications have been chosen for performing fault injection campaigns
such as: a Matrix multiplication between two 16*16 matrices of integer data, a
Fast Fourier Transform(FFT) of a 16*16 matrix and Sobel filter on a 16*16 input
matrix. We considered four different conditions for implementing the applications:
not mitigated, applying Duplication With Comparison(DWC) technique, Triple
Modular Redundancy(TMR) and applying Algorithm Based Fault Tolerance(ABFT)
mitigation techniques.
The obtained results are presented in Table3.9, 3.10, 3.11. The percentage of
effects are classified as: application error which represented the case where the
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Fig. 3.57 Single streaming processor SET sensitivity overview for injecting 1000 SET pulses.
application generates erroneous results; Time out for the case that the application
never reaches the generation of the data output; Silent which is dedicated to the case
that the injected errors do not generate any erroneous results within the executed
application and the computed results correspond to normal execution without faults.
The average fault injection performance, considering the tested application, may
range from 8 to 14 transient errors per minute, while the results are classified as pure
combination comparison.
The fault injection speed of the proposed platform has a gain in time that may
vary from 2 to 3 orders of magnitude with respect to physical gate level simulation.
Moreover, with the proposed method, it is possible to simulate the entire core
executing the while application.
As a results, two different scenarios have been observed. Firstly, the application
error rate increases with respect to the SET pulse width. Secondly, the increasing
ration is not linear since a wider transient pulse is not filtered on more logical
paths than shorter ones. Therefore, the application error rate has been increased
exponentially.
Moreover, with respect the applied mitigation techniques, the reduction of the
fault tolerance capability with respect to the injected transient errors is noticeable. In
particular, considering matrix multiplication, the ABFT approach should be able to
mitigate all the injected faults. The results shows a different behavior since a transient
error may be propagated to many FFs in the computational registers. Therefore,
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nullifying the single fault scenario which can be confirmed with the radiation test
data obtained previously in [56].
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3.5 Convergence Single Event Transient Analyzer -
CSETA
When a highly charged particle strikes the silicon junction of the device, the transfer
of the energy cause a voltage glitch or voltage pulse known as Single Event Transient
(SET). The induced SET can propagate through several paths, leading to several
SET pulses which may cause multiple upsets in the circuit if they reach to them.
When the SET pulse propagate through a logic gate, it may undergo pulse width
modulation known as PIPB effect which is due to delay unbalance at different circuit
nodes. However, it can be more critical if during the life of SET, the pulse faces a
divergence node and propagate through two or more divergence paths which merge
at the same convergence node.
3.5.1 SET pulse behavior at convergence point
When the SET pulse is generated inside the implemented circuits, the pulse is
propagating through logic nodes and routing interconnections of the implemented
circuit. Moreover, during this propagation, the pulse is affected by PIPB. During this
propagation, if the pulse encounters a divergence node of the circuit, it will multiply
and propagate through several paths. If the multiplied pulses reach to the storage
element and be sampled by them, the single generated pulse can create multiple
SEUs. In particular, this condition can be more critical if the various propagated
SET pulses converge together at the convergence node.
To elaborate more, during the life-cycle, if the pulse traverse a divergence node,
it multiplies and propagate through several divergence paths. If the propagated
multiplied SET pulses join at the convergence point, the outcome of SET at the
convergence brings out a new phenomenon defined as Convergence SET (C-SET).
Figure 3.58 shows a simple case where convergence SET can be generated.
The output of SET at the convergence point depends on the PIPB value and the
difference between the delay of the two divergence paths. Considering SETA as
the SET source pulse which propagate through the logics and routing resources of
path(A), while broadened or filtered due to PIPB affect as well as SETB as the SET
source pulse propagated through path(B), then C-SET in the convergence point can
be sorted in three groups:
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Fig. 3.58 An example of SET encountering the divergence point and convergence point.
1. In a case that the difference between the propagation delay of the two paths is
more than the width of the first pulse reaching to the convergence point, the
output SET at the convergence point will be provided as two separate pulses
with the width equal to SETA and SETB.
2. In a case that the difference between the delay of the two paths is less than the
width of the first pulse reaching to the convergence point, the two pulses will
overlap and create a pulse with extremely large width, larger than SETA and
SETB. The most critical condition will be observed when the delay between the
two divergence paths is equal to the width of the first SET pulse reaching to the
convergence point. In this sub-case, the C-SET observed at the convergence
point has a width equal to the sum of propagation delays difference and the
width of the second pulse reaching to the convergence point.
3. This third case is dedicated to the condition that the difference between the
two paths is minimal enough to create the total overlapping of the two pulses.
As a result, the outcome of SET is equal to the maximum width between SETA
and SETB.
Expecting that SETA is reaching to the convergence point before SETB, Figure
3.59 represents the correlation between the two propagated paths, the different of the
delay of the two paths and the condition of the output SET at the convergence point
while equation 3.8 is representing the condition of each group. Moreover, Figure
3.60 represents the correlation between the maximum width of SET observed at the
convergence point and difference of the delay between two paths. As it has been
mentioned, case 2 is representing the worse conditions due to the widening of the
SET pulse at the convergence point.
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Fig. 3.59 Outcome of SET at the convergence point- C-SET.
Fig. 3.60 Correlation between maximum width of C-SET and Difference of delays between
two paths.
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Case(I) :
Delaypath(A)−Delaypath(B) > SETA
Case(II) :
Delaypath(A) ∗Delaypath(B) <= SETA
(Delaypath(A)−Delaypath(B))+SETB > SETA
MostCriticalCase :
Delaypath(A)−Delaypath(B) = SETA
Case(III) :
Delaypath(A)−Delaypath(B) <= SETA
(Selaypath(A)−Delaypath(B))+SETB < SETA
(3.8)
3.5.2 Integration of CSETA with commercial tools
Since Convergence SET can introduce a more critical situation for the system with
respect to SET pulses, it is mandatory to evaluate the behavior of the implemented
circuit with respect to Convergence SET. Therefore, we developed an environment
for identification of SET propagation considering its convergence condition within a
circuit. Therefore, a software tool has developed which is integrated with the modern
version of commercial tool for designing Integrated Circuits. Figure 3.61 represents
the developed workflow.
The developed Integrated Design Flow (IDF) is linked with the classical design
tool chain starting with the Hardware Description of the design, going through
synthesizer, mapping and place and route. The IDF starts elaborating the post-layout
design and generating Physical Design Constraints (PDC) and Simulation Delay File
(SDF) from post-layout netlist. The PDC file contains all the locations of the logic
resources and input/output pins of the target FPGA device while SDF contains the
delay information of the implemented design. Based on the PDC and SDF files of the
design under the test, we developed a tool to extract the Physical Design Description
Annotated (PDDA) of the design which contains the delay information of the routing
and logics.
In order to analyze the implemented circuit regarding C-SET, we started from
the PDDA file, elaborating the physical description of the circuit, extracting all the
paths of the design. This extraction has been considered starting from each nodes of
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Fig. 3.61 Scheme of developed flow for accurate analysis of C-SET.
the paths until it reaches a storage element or FF. Theses extracted paths has been
elaborated in three phases, as represented in pseudo code of Figure 3.62.
For the first phase, the behavior of SET propagation through the path has been
evaluated. To do so, the propagation behavior of each logic cell and routing resources
connecting the logics together are studied. As a result, we calculated the Pulse
Induced Propagation Broadening (PIPB) effect for all the extracted paths. As a
next step, we elaborate the extracted path in order to identify the possible condition
of occurrence of C-SET. Therefore, we develop a tool that first of all classifies all
the logic cells of the design which has a divergence characteristic. To elaborate
more, the tools extracts all the logic cells having more than one outputs. A logic
cell with more than one outputs generates several branches in the main path. The
tool continues to extract all the branches connecting to the divergence point, and
filtering the branches which are reaching to the common logic cells, defined as
Convergence point. As a result of this phase, we extracted all the paths starting from
the common divergence point and converging in a common logic node which leads
to all the possible locations of occurrence of C-SET. However, reaching to the same
convergence node is not enough to generate C-SET phenomenon. Therefore, the
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Fig. 3.62 The pseudo code for the identification of the SET width and amplitude in a post
layout circuit.
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next phase is dedicated to analyze the extracted branches regarding timing to analyze
the extracted branches regarding timing to recognize all the authorize location of
occurrence of C-SET.
As it has been mentioned before, the PDDA file of the implemented design
contains timing information. Therefore, the tool is linking between the extracted
branches and the timing constraints of PDDA file and classifying the branched based
on timing. Starting from the divergence point until the defined convergence point,
for each single branch, the tool is calculating the delay of the path, which takes
into account the delay of the logic node and also the routing connecting the logics.
At the end of this phase, we extracted all the branches between the divergence and
convergence point and the delay of each branches. Based on the calculated delay, we
classified the branches. As it is shown in Figure 3.58, if we consider two branched
of A and B which start from the divergence point and end at the convergence point,
the tool is calculating the delay regarding path(A) and path(B) and the different
between them. Depending on the different of delay, the C-SET at the convergence
point is estimated which can be classified in several groups. If the delta delay of
paths are less than the duration of the expected SET, single SET will be observed at
the convergence point. However, due to the overlapping of SET pulses, the duration
of observed C-SET is wider as much as the different of delay between two paths.
While, if the delta delay of two paths are more than the duration of the expected SET,
the SET propagation through two paths will cross the convergence point separately
which generated double SET at convergence point which has the distance equal to
delay delay of the branches shown in equation 3.8.
3.5.3 C-SETA on Flash-based FPGAs
The proposed design flow has been experimentally evaluated by means of SET static
analysis using A3P250 Flash-based FPGA manufactured by Microsemi having 6,144
logic Versatiles. We used Libero soC commercial design flow to generate the PDC,
SDF and post-layout netlist. We select six circuits with various complexity from
ITC99 benchmark collection [22], a Cordic core ad RISC microprocessor. The
characteristics of the selected circuit such as the number of Versatile used as Logic
Function or Flip-Flop and maximal working frequency have been reported in Table
3.12.
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Table 3.12 Characteristics of the original benchmark circuits
Circuits Versatile[#] FFs[#] Frequency[MHz]
B05 415 66 47
B09 493 67 46
B12 565 123 48
B13 162 50 52
CORDIC 956 240 45
RISC 1,401 1,156 42
We analyzed the circuits SET sensitivity using the developed tool able to evaluate
the convergence SET. For the purpose of our experiments, we performed the analysis
considering three type of SETs (0.3, 0.6 and 0.8 ns), 5000 SET injection for each
type of SET pulses. Please consider that SET width lower than 1 ns corresponds to
the most probable event generated by heavy ion strike on Flash-based FPGA 130 nm
technology [57].
As a first step, we performed the analysis of sensitivity of the implemented circuit
regarding normal SET using SETA, explained in the previous section. In Table 3.13,
the results of SET analysis have been reported in terms of status of each Flip-Flop
as:
1. Filtered: it stands for number of Flip-Flops where SET pulses are filtered
before reaching to the Flip-Flops.
2. Partially Filtered: representing the case that PIPB effect is between 1 and 0
which causes partially filtered of SET pulse.
3. Broadened: which reports the number of Flip-Flops in which SET pulses are
reaching to them by PIPB value more than 1, which introduced the broadening
case of SET pulses.
At the end, we reported the number of possible cases for C-SET in the implemented
circuits. It is possible to observe that the number of possible C-SET events is directly
proportional to the arithmetic circuitry used by the netlist.
We continued the analysis by applying our proposed flow to evaluate in details
the sensitivity of the circuits under the test regarding C-SET. As a result, we classified
the possible C-SET events in three groups:
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Table 3.13 Comprehensive SET sensitivity using static analysis tool- 5000 SET pulses lower
than 1 ns are injected.
Circuits Filtered#] Partially Filtered[#] Broadened[#] C-SET[#]
B05 9 3 8 9
B09 3 6 11 18
B12 1 7 13 8
B13 14 8 7 38
CORDIC 12 28 39 42
RISC 204 184 196 56
Fig. 3.63 Classification of C-SET in terms of criticality.
• Case 1: representing the number of cased which two separate SET pulses are
expected.
• Case 2: as the condition of overlapped SET which one single SET pulse with
drastic increasing of pulse width is expected.
• Case 3: representing the overlapped SET while the width of C-SET is equal
to the maximal pulse width of propagated SETs through divergence paths,
presented in Figure: 3.63.
Between these three classified cases, Case 1 and 3 are not introducing more
critical condition regarding SET sensitivity comparing to normal SET. In fact, these
cases can be treated the same as normal SETs in terms of mitigation solutions, such
as guard gate approaches introduced in the following chapter. The most critical case
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in case 2 which outcome SET at the convergence point has wider width comparing to
other cases. Therefore, a mitigation solution with higher filtering capability should
be applied to the circuit in order to cover the filtering of normal SETs and C-SETs.
3.5.4 Research advancement on Single Event Transient Analyzer
In order to provide an accurate analysis of the reliability of the design regarding
SET implemented on different modern VLSI technologies such as Flash-based
FPGA, SRAM-based FPGA and GPGPU, a new CAD tool has been developed. The
developed CAD tool, SETA, is integrated with the standard FPGA design flow. The
developed tool takes into account the pulse propagation behavior through the routing
and logic resources of the design and evaluate the pulse broadening and filtering
effects while propagating through the implemented circuit. The developed tool has
been known as the first tool applicable to large industrial circuits in order to provide
the sensitivity of the implemented design.
Chapter 4
Mitigation of Single Event Transient
The aggressive scaling trend in nanometer technologies has significantly impacted
the rates of Single Event Transient(SETs) faults within the electronic circuits. Several
mitigation solutions have been proposed in order to make the modern complex system
robust against Single Event Transients effect. Among the studies dedicated to FPGA
technologies, FPGAs with Flash-based configuration cells are mainly addressed
since their configuration memory cells are essentially immune to bit-flips. Therefore,
several studies are proposed for mitigation of the occurrence of SETs. As a tradition
fault-tolerant strategy, Triple Modular Redundancy(TMR) can be mentioned which
is based on the redundancy concept [58]. Some techniques have been proposed
based on the replication design methodology by using time or spatial redundancy.
Although, techniques based on redundancy introduce delay, power and area overhead
to the system [59]. To overcome these disadvantages, recent methods perform the
sensitivity analysis of the circuits to identify the sensitive nodes and apply mitigation
solution to them, known as selectively mitigating [60] [61] [62].
Mitigation solution based on filtering are applied to many designs without con-
sidering timing and resource overhead constraints [63]. Other solutions are based
on analytical tools which has been confirmed radiation-test experimental analysis.
These tools are providing a possible alternative to time-consuming physical design
simulation [64]. ( I would like to complete this part***).
In order to mitigate the Single Event Transient affecting Flash-based FPGAs, we
proposed two mitigation solutions: The first one is based on the filtering Guard Gate
which is applied to selective sensitive points of the circuits based on the performed
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SET analysis. However, this method is suffering the disadvantages of introducing
the timing and area overhead to the design under the test. Secondary, we proposed
a mitigation solution based on the charge sharing concept which overcomes the
problem of introduced delay in the circuits since the method is capable of filtering
the SET pulses with zero-timing overhead.
4.1 Guard Gate mitigation
In order to mitigate the SET pulses in the circuit under the study, we propose a new
mapper algorithm in order to selectively introduce SET-filtering scheme focusing on
optimizing the circuit performance and reducing the overall SET sensitivity. This
techniques is providing an enormous benefit versus already used implementation
tools that apply SET-filtering and guard-gate for all the user memory or Flip-Flop
resources [60] [65] [66].
The developed Integrated Design Flow (IDF) includes three groups of tools: SET
Analyzer (SETA, which has been explained in details in chapter 3), a netlist modifier
and a design physical implementation tool. Figure 4.1 is representing the developed
IDF.
The developed environment is starting with the classical design tool chain includ-
ing synthesis, mapping and place and route tools. From the classical tool chain, the
IDF elaborates the post-layout design and adopting a technology radiation sensitivity
data provided by FPGA producers or generated by preliminary radiation-test charac-
terization, including elementary radiation sensitivity per each type of logic functions
or routing segment implemented by FPGA [67].
The SET mitigation flow has three steps:
1. SET Analysis (SETA): The circuit under the study is analyzed regarding Single
Event Transient by SETA tool, explained in details in the previous chapter. As
a result of SETA tool, two reports are generated. Firstly, a file reporting a list
of maximal glitched observed at the input of each Flip-Flop. Secondly, a file
reporting the location of Flip-Flop cells and their logic path delays.
2. Netlist Filter Mitigation insertion: The synthesized netlist of the circuit under
the study has been modified by inserting filtering circuit to improve the SET
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Fig. 4.1 The Overview of the SET-aware mitigation flow including the SET propagation
analysis, the Netlist filter mitigation insertion and the marco-oriented mapping and filtering-
driven place and route.
mitigation. The insertion has been done considering the post-synthesis Verilog
description of the design. To elaborate more, based on the performed SET
analysis performed by SETA in the previous step, the path which reports the
maximal glitched are modified and the filtering logic are inserted.
3. Physical implementation: The modified netlist goes through the mapper and
place and route tool. The mapper elaborates the netlist optimizing the SET
filtering capability by creating proper design macro. At the end, the place and
route algorithm specify the logic versatile locations and the routing segments
that optimize the SET filtering of the design without penalize the circuit
performances.
4.1.1 SET propagation analysis
As it has been elaborated in chapter 3, SETA tool has been adopted to the design
under the test in order to provide the sensitivity report of the design. Therefore,
we start with the generation of source SET pulses, propagating the generated pulse
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Fig. 4.2 The SET propagation method including the PIPB computation on the propagation
node.
through the paths of the design. During this propagation, the Propagation Induced
Pulse Broadening(PIPB) model has been applied which elaborated the transformation
of the pulse shape along the traverse path up to a Flip-Flop or other storage element
for each logic cone. This PIPB coefficient is obtained based on the number and
type of logic gates spanning from the SET sensitive nodes to the drain Flip-Flop
and logic input node Fan-in. Figure 4.2 represents how the PIPB coefficient of the
propagation node is calculated considering the existence of Gate2, Gate3 which
Gate4 is representing the Fan-in. The details of this steps has been elaborated in
Chapter 3.
4.1.2 Netlist filter mitigation insertion
The typical SET mitigation techniques for Flash-based FPGAs applies Guard Gate(GG)
logic gate structure at the input of all the Flip-Flops [62]. Figure 4.3 represents the
conceptual scheme of the Guard Gate techniques.
The traditional techniques of inserting Guard Gate filtering has two main disad-
vantages: Firstly, since the Guard Gate filtering is inserted in the inputs of all the
FFs, it has a drastic area overhead. Secondly, inserting Guard Gate logics which is at
least 6 gates for each Flip-Flops introduces a performance degradation,Figure 4.3.a.
In order to overcome the mentioned drawbacks of the traditional Guard Gate
techniques, we developed an algorithm which insert filtering logic not for all the
Flip-Flops but for all the logic gates shared between logic cones, as illustrated in
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Fig. 4.3 Traditional Flip-Flop based guard-gate and SET-Filtering solution(a)compared to
the SET-filtering scheme inserted by the netlist insertion mapper on logic gates shared by
logic cones(b).
Figure 4.3.b. The algorithm identifies the points in the netlist for inserting filtering
logics and calculates the effective SET filtering delay.
To elaborate more, firstly, the algorithm calculates the broadening coefficient for
the used resources with respect the the calculated maximal SET glitches report. The
broadening coefficient, ∆BGi for each logic gates where i is the index of the gate and
∆BG j for each routing net while j is representing a specific routing segment.
Please notice that a positive value of the coefficient is representing a broadening
effect while a negative value is presenting the filtering of SET. The computation
provides further information of the broadening contribution of each logic total path,
represented by ∑B. The broadening contribution is calculated for each Flip-Flop
element and for all the gates shared between two or more logical paths.
Figure 4.4 illustrates the applied proposed techniques to the portion of the circuit.
Considering real cases, the growing maximal SET broadening width contribution
∆b and the total SET broadening contribution ∑B are computed for each logic gate
and routing segment in the target design. Without applying any filtering logic, the
maximal SET width at the input of the Flip-Flop A is 1.2ns and Flip-Flop B is 1.8ns.
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Fig. 4.4 An example of the netlist mitigation algorithm as a first phase on a circuit portion:
the calculation of the broadening coefficients in nanoseconds.
The second phase of the algorithm is dedicated to the insertion of the gates. The
concept of this phase is represented in Figure 4.3.b. To elaborate more, the developed
algorithm calculates the number of required inverters for filtering the SET pulse.
Figure 4.5shows a simple example of the inserted filtering scheme for filtering SET
pulses with the width of 1.6 ns. As a result, all the SET reaching to this points of
the logic cones are filtered. Simultaneously, the SET broadening contributions at the
FLip-FLop A and B are reduced to 0.6ns and 0.3ns. Therefore, the FF input driver is
able to filter these SET pulses.
4.1.3 Physical implementation
The physical implementation is based on macro-oriented placement and routing
algorithm. We developed a global placement algorithm focusing on SET pulses
filtering. Since it is necessary to provide an effective placement for the inserted
filtering scheme, the global placement is executed prior to floor-planning. Moreover,
we developed a filtering-based place and route algorithm in order to generate the
final design for producing the configuration memory file.
The developed global placement algorithm generates a floor-planning solution
based on a set of constraints. Firstly, the algorithm generates a set of macro-blocks
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Fig. 4.5 Application of the netlist mitigation algorithm second phase to a circuit portion: the
insertion of the filtering scheme on the shared logic path.
for placing in the FPGA area corresponding to the gates used by the netlist insertion
algorithm. Therefore, considering MB0, MB1,..., MBn the set of macro-blocks
generated during the netlist modification phase, where each MBi has an associated
dimension(height and width), the goal of the placement algorithm is to provide a
placement rectangular area R for each of the macro-block in a way that:
1. The resource of the area Ai used by the macro-block has a sufficient resources.
2. Two MBs do not overlap.
3. The resources within the MBs fulfill the timing delay defined during the netlist
insertion phase.
The pseudo code of the developed algorithm is presented in Figure 4.6. The
algorithm start with initialization of the design macro-block. The information
regarding macro-blocks is provided as a result of SET analysis performed by SETA
and the netlist insertion algorithm back annotates it. The algorithm continues by
clustering the various MBs with respect to the number of Inverters and creating a set
of block To Be Placed(TBP). As a last step, the algorithm focuses on the allocation
of the clustered MBs. To elaborate more, a MB is added to the Area Cluster(AC)
only if it is able to maximize its filtering capability considering also the position of
the other placed MBs.
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Fig. 4.6 The global placement implementation algorithm.
4.1.4 Guard Gate Mitigation on Rad-Hard RTG4 Flash-based
FPGAs
In order to fulfill the increasing aerospace requirements in relation to the Total
Ionizing Dose(TID), a new radiation-hardened Flash-based FPGA family, RTG4, has
been recently manufactures [58]. RTG4 technology is a TID tolerance more than 100
krad due to the complementary or C-Flash and configuration cell [59]. Therefore,
this family of Flash-based technology is able to tolerate higher level of Ionizing Dose
rather than the previous N-Flash.
Considering the transient radiation effects, RTG4 family is offering an embedded
SEU and SET mitigation scheme that rely on Triplicated Flip-Flop architecture and
internal SET mitigation. However, the available implementation tool is not allow
the designer to apply the proper redundancy and SET filtering setup. Therefore,
we choose RTG4 as a modern Radiation-hardened technology for applying our
developed environment and selectively SET-filtering scheme. In order to do this, we
evaluate the elaborate of the RTG4 cell library and it is interfacing with the available
tools.
Background on RTG4 Architecture
The RTG4 Flash-based FPGA technology is based on an array of Flash-technology
based radiation tolerant logic elements embedding some hard ASIC blocks such
as RAM memory modules and DSP blocks. The embedded registers are capable
of mitigation Single Event Transient by inserting filtering logic. On the other side,
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Fig. 4.7 The functional block diagram of logic element of the RTG4 Flash-based FPGA
family.
memories have a built-in error detection and correction mechanism(EDAC). The
major resources of the RTG4 FPGA architecture are: logic elements, interface logic
elements and I/O modules [68]. For applying our developed environment, we focused
on the logic elements that compose the larger part of the FPGA resources [69].
Figure 4.7 represent the RTG4 logic element which consists on 4 inputs Look-up
Table(LUT), a self-corrected Triple Modular Redundancy(S-TMR) Flip-Flop and a
dedicated carry chain.
The 4-LUT with carry chain logic can be configured to any 4-input combination
function where the LUT output is XORed with the carry input signal(Cin). When
the LUT is implementing a combinational function, output S is the principal output.
The carry chain has a specific hardwired interconnection between the logic elements
able to reduce the propagation between the logic elements which is reducing the
propagation delay through the carry chain. The new advantages and offers of RTG4
technology is the SET mitigated asynchronous and self corrected TMR-D Flip-
Flop(S-TMR). Particularly, each STMR Flip-Flop has an Asynchonous majority
voter logic that ensures SEU immunity when the SET pulse width at the input D of
the functional logic block is comprised within the user defined SET filtering delay
coefficient delay-sel. Looking at the implementation tool, when the SET filtering
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Table 4.1 Characteristics of the implemented circuits
Circuit 4LUTS[#] DFF[#]] Area Overhead[%] Max Clock Period[ns]
B05 205 46 - 10.49
B05_SET 205 46 0 11.22
B05_GG 481 46 134 16.31
B05_SEL_MAP 255 46 24 12.10
B12 378 119 - 8.47
B12_SET 378 119 0 9.40
B12_GG 1,092 119 189 15.45
B12_SEL_MAP 502 119 33 9.82
B14 1,607 216 - 21.14
B14_SET 1,607 216 0 22.09
B14_GG 2,903 216 81 28.44
B14_SEL_MAP 1,895 216 18 22.20
is activated in the tool, the filtering logics are inserted which can lead to the huge
reduction in the timing performances. However, the commercial tool is not able
to provide the effective width of the SETs for filtering. Therefore, we proposed to
apply our developed environemnt to acquire an effective mitigation of SET on RTG4
family.
Experimental Results
We applied our developed environment to RTG4 RTG4G150-CG1657 Rad-Hard
Flash-based FPGAs and we select three different benchmark from ITC99 benchmark
circuit [22]. We implemented the benchmarks in four different versions: original
unhardened, commercial too-based SET filtering(_SET ), Flip-Flop-based guard-gate
solution(_GG) and the proposed approach(_SEL_MAP). Table 4.1 is reporting the
characteristic of the chosen circuits. Regarding the mitigation, the commercial tool
is set for filtering of SET with 0.6 ns while we set the filtering for pulses with the
width of 1.5 ns.
As it is reported, the proposed solution minimize the area overhead reaching
an average of 25% with respect to the original circuit without mitigation. This
percentage is extremely effective if compared with the guard-gate solution, which
has an overhead of about 135%.
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Table 4.2 SET fault simulation results
Circuit Observed SET[%] Filtered SETs[%]
B05 85 15
B05_SET 32 68
B05_GG 12 88
B05_SEL_MAP 1 99
B12 87 13
B12_SET 33 67
B12_GG 16 84
B12_SEL_MAP 3 97
B14 89 11
B14_SET 36 64
B14_GG 15 85
B14_SEL_MAP 3 97
The capability of SET mitigation techniques are reported in term of SET fault
simulation. We considered the injection of 10,000 SETs in random locations and
sensitive nodes of the benchmark circuits. The width of source SETs are considered
between 0.01 ns and 1.00 ns and they have been injected in all the possible sensitive
points of the netlists. Table 4.2 is reporting the result of SET sensitivity evaluation.
The results are classified as: SET causing erroneous circuit behavior(Observed SET)
and Filtered SETs.
As it is illustrated in the results, our proposed environment provides a mitigation
techniques which is 4 times better than guard-gate solution. Please notice that the
actual results are related to the commercial solution that does not allow SET filtering
delay for SETs with width larger than 0.6ns. However, considering the timing
characteristic, it is feasible that all of the techniques is introducing timing overhead
and performance degradation. Therefore, as a next step, we propose a mitigation
solution with zero timing overhead.
4.2 SET Mitigation by adding Charge Sharing logics
on Flash-based FPGA
Several SET mitigation solutions have been proposed. Some solutions focused on the
physical layout modification while the other solutions are focused on the modification
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of routing segments without Flip-Flops placement modification. However, theses
solutions require the reconfiguration of the resources which leads to the modification
of logic and routing segment and affecting the overall circuit performances. Solutions
based on filtering structure insertion which as it has been mentioned previously, they
introduce heavy performance and hardware resource overhead.
To overcome these disadvantages, we proposed a new mitigation solution which
is not introducing timing degradation. This mitigation technique is based on charge
sharing gate insertion into the circuit netlist which is decreasing the sensitivity of the
nodes. This method is known as the First approach able to implement SET filtering
on Flash-based FPGAs without any timing penalty. The developed mitigation
approach is based on two concepts: Firstly, the application of the charge-sharing
phenomena on the Flash-based FPGA logic element. Secondly, the control of the
routing segment buffering voltage threshold level.
Charge sharing is a concern for CMOS technology. This is principally due
to the higher packing densities, reduced nodal charge and space between device
resources. Specifically, for nanometer Flash-based FPGAs, the proximity of device
nodes results in charge collection in multiple logic switches when a single heavy ion
strike a node. The phenomena results in different transient pulse shapes related to the
LET absorbed by the switch junction. The proposed mitigation solution modifies a
place and routed circuit on Flash-based FPGA by inserting programmed logic gates
in ad-hoc netlist nodes. The insertion is performed in order to distribute the charge
collection through a circuit logical path, reducing the amplitude and the width of the
transient pulse traversing the logic elements. Since the insertion of charge sharing
gates increases the fan-out of the selected nodes, we control the insertion while
avoiding the increasing of node delay. This is possible due to the lower buffering
threshold level provided in FPGA routing node: if the fan-out is below the threshold
of the technology under the study, the delay of the traversing signal is not affected.
On the other side, the added logical node will reduce the PIPB effect. Therefore,
nullifying the SET effect before reaching a sampling node.
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Fig. 4.8 Overview of the developed flow including SET analysis and charge sharing mitiga-
tion.
4.2.1 Proposed design flow
To mitigate the SET induced by radiation particles striking silicon structure of Flash-
based FPGA devices with charge sharing mitigation technique, the proposed design
flow is illustrated in Figure 4.8.
The flow starts with the output files from the commercial/standard FPGA design
flow, which includes the Post-layout Netlist, SDF and the Physical Design Con-
straints(PDC). Firstly, the Post-Layout Netlist is converted to a format designed
in-house named Physical Design Description(PDD) file which stores the circuit in
a graph representation. As a next step, the timing information extracted from the
SDF and the placement information within the PDC, the SET analyzer tool(SETA,
which has been explained in details in chapter 3) is executed. As a results, SETA tool
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Fig. 4.9 The charge sharing mitigation algorithm for Flash-based FPGAs.
generated a SET report which contains the information regarding SET sensitivity
for each Flip-Flop in the design, the worst case SET pulse width taking into account
the PIPB effects and so on. At the end, the zero-timing SET mitigation algorithm
is executed to generate the final SET mitigated design. Please notice that the SET
mitigation step can be carried out with extra user constraints declaring specifically to
include or exclude certain part of the design for charge sharing structure insertion.
Figure 4.9 is representing the pseudo code of the developed algorithm.
The goal of the mitigation algorithm is insertion of extra charge sharing structure
into the design to reduce the possible SET pulse amplitude and width when it traverse
the logic paths. Since the insertion of the charge sharing structure increases the fan-
out of the selected nodes, the algorithm also controls the threshold for insertion of the
fan-out to avoid introduction of extra delay in the path which results in performance
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degradation. This is possible due to lower buffering threshold level provided in
FPGA routing node: if the fan-out is below that threshold, the delay of the traversing
signal is not affected. On the other side, the added charge sharing structure will
reduce the PIPB effect which leads to nullifying the SET effect before reaching a
memory element such as Latch, Flip-Flops or IO blocks.
The mitigation algorithm starts with loading the Post-Layout Netlist and the SET
report generated by the SETA tool. The mitigation is performed in three phases:
1. It computes the Resistive Capacitive(RC)load for each circuit node within
the original netlist. The computation is done adding the timing of buffered
or un-buffered nets connected to the output pins of the considered node. The
coefficient of the RC load is obtained dividing the timing by the fan-out of
each node.
2. It selects the suitable nodes for the logic charge sharing insertion. The selection
is done by interpolating the PIPB values considering the original RC load and
obtaining the expected size of charge sharing structure for each node in terms
of number of gates. The selection of the node where to apply charge sharing
gates is determined by combinational permutation identifying the solution that
minimize the PIPB effect while limiting overall number of added gates per
circuit logical path. Figure 4.10 is reporting an example of interpolation data,
where it is possible to notice that when charge sharing structure contains less
than 40 gates, it is possible to achieve a reduction o the PIPB coefficient, for
example filtering of SET without affecting the timing characteristics of the
node.
3. It modifies the netlist adding charge-sharing structure of proper size to the
selected logic nodes. Finally, the algorithm exports the modified netlist and
placement constraints file. The two files then can be imported in the com-
mercial FPGA design flow to generate the final design implementation. An
example of the application of charge sharing mitigation algorithm is shown
in Figure 4.11. To elaborate more, considering the original netlist A where
three SETs pulses having width of 0.3, 0.6 and 0.8ns can broadened up to 0.38,
0.81 and 1.08 ns since PIPB coefficient of all gates are positive. Considering
the application of the charge sharing structure at the netlist B, an electrical
masking or reduction of all the SET pulses is noticeable.
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Fig. 4.10 Charge sharing number of gates per logic nodes with respect to the routing delay
and PIPB coefficient.
Table 4.3 Characteristics of the original benchmark circuits
Circuit VErsatile[#] FFs[#] frequency[MHz]
B05 415 66 47
B09 493 67 46
B12 565 123 48
B13 162 50 52
CORDIC 956 240 45
RISC 1,401 1,156 42
4.2.2 Experimental results
In order to verify the effectiveness of the proposed mitigation technique, we select
several circuits with different complexity: 4 circuits from the ITC99 benchmark
collection [22], a Cordic core and a RISC microprocessor.
The selected circuits have been implemented on A3P250 Flash-based FPGA
manufactured by Microsemi having 6,144 logic VersaTile. Libero SoC commercial
design flow has been used in order to generate the PDC, SDF and Post-layout
netlist in Verilog for evaluating the mitigation algorithm. Table 4.3 is reporting the
characteristics of the selected circuits, such as number of VersaTiles configured as
Logic function or FLip-FLop and the maximal working frequency.
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Fig. 4.11 The key concept of the Charge Sharing mitigation algorithm.
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Table 4.4 Comprehensive Flip-Flop SET sensitivity using the static analysis tool
Circuit
SET width lower than 1 ns
Logical Masked[#] Filtered[#] Partially Filtered[#] Broadened[#]
b05 46 9 3 8
b09 47 3 6 11
b12 102 1 7 13
b13 21 14 28 39
CORDIC 161 12 28 39
RISC 572 204 184 196
As it has been mentioned in the flow, we started with the classical design chain,
exporting the information required to the proposed environment. We analyzed
the circuit SET sensitivity using SETA tool. Since the SET width lower than 1ns
corresponds to the most probable events generated by heavy ions strike on the Flash-
based FPGA 130nm technology [70], as a source SET, we choose three types of
SETS(0.3, 0.6 and 0.8ns). Table 4.4 is representing the results of SETA tool. (This
table needs to be fixed)
The results are categorized in the following groups:
1. Logical Masked: represents a case in which no SET in the input cone could
reach the FF due to logic mask.
2. Filtered: dedicated to cased in which no SET in the input cone are totally
filtered.
3. Partially filtered: representing the Flip-Flops where the SET in the input cone
could reach the Flip-Flops but with a reduced width.
We evaluate two versions of circuits while applying two mitigation techniques:
Firstly, applying place and route and guard gate mitigation techniques using a maxi-
mal guard-gate filtering of 1ns, knows as P&R-GG [71]. Secondly, our proposed
method without excluding Flip-Flops in the design during SET mitigation. For both
versions, Synopsys Synplify TMR has been applied exclusively on the Flip-Flops as
in real design, mitigation solutions for SET would be usually adapted.
We used the electrical pulse injection platform to inject in random sensitive nodes
of the circuits. We injected 5,000 SETs lower than 1ns for each circuit and report
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Table 4.5 SET fault injection wrong answers comparison
Circuit
Wrong Answer[%]
Plain P&R-GG Proposed Method
b05 68.5 12.2 4.3
b09 72.6 8.4 2.6
b12 83.2 9.4 3.1
b13 54.8 16.5 4.1
CORDIC 89.4 19.6 4.3
RISC 94.6 21.6 4.8
Table 4.6 Timing and area overhead for each method
Circuit b05 b09 b12 b13 CORDIC RISC
Timing[%]
P&R-GG 12 13 15 16 19 18
Proposed Method 0 0 0 0 0 0
Area[#]
P&R-GG 27 28 28 27 32 31
Proposed Method 25 27 25 24 28 27
the results in Table 4.5 where we show the percentage of wrong answers, when the
circuit produces at least one output data different from the expected one.
From the Table 4.5 it is observable that our method leads to the decrease of wrong
answers drastically with a noticeable improvement with respect to the result reported
at [71]. Table 4.6 reports the timing area overhead in terms of max frequency
degradation percentage and number of VersaTiles respectively, of the two SET
mitigation solutions against original version. It is noticeable that our proposed
method provides no timing penalties. Moreover, the area overhead is slightly less
than the P&R-GG method.
4.2.3 Research advancement on mitigation of Single Event Tran-
sient
In order to tolerate the implemented design regarding SET phenomenon, two mit-
igation solutions have been proposed. The mitigation solution based on inserting
Guard Gate logic block and mitigation solution based on inserting charge sharing
logic gates. In the first approach, inserting Guard Gate logic block, the SET pulse is
filtered by passing through the logic blocks. There are several approaches that apply
the same mitigation solution and applying the filtering blocks before all the storage el-
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ement of the implemented circuits. Taking as an example the new radiation hardened
RTG4 Flash-based FPGA, which provides the possibilities to add the Guard Gate
logic before each Flip-Flops on the implemented circuits. However, the proposed
approach has been known as the first one that is not applying the filtering blocks
before all the storage elements but adding the blocks in the sensitive Flip-Flops of
the implemented design. Moreover, using the proposed wok-flow, it is possible to
tune the filtering capability with respect to the duration of the SET pulse. However,
using this methodology, the increasing of the area overheads and timing penalties
are an open issues. Therefore, the second mitigation has been proposed. The second
methodology which is based on the charge sharing concept, is knows as the first
methodology able to filter SET pulses without introducing any timing penalties.
Chapter 5
Industrial Application
5.1 Radiation Test: Ultra High Energy Heavy Ion
Test Beam on Xilinx Kintex-7 SRAM-based FPGA
During recent years, FPGAs have attract more attentions due to their increasing
performances and high flexibility. However, in order to apply theses devices to
mission critical applications such as avionic and space missions applications, the
reliability of FPGA device has to be evaluated against faults and errors induced
by radiation effects. Regarding SRAM-based FPGA, the SRAM cells holding the
configuration data of the circuit design implemented on the device are among the
devices highly susceptible against Single Event Upsets (SEU) induced by radiation
effect when hit by charged particles [72]. One SEU in the configuration memory can
cause a system misbehavior depending on the affected bit. Therefore, it is necessary
to evaluate the device and design sensitivity against SEU in configuration memory
and apply suitable fault tolerant strategy to reach a successful mission. Radiation
test is one of the common methods used for such evaluation since it provides the
most similar environment with respect to real space environment. Radiation test can
emulate the space environment using accelerated particles to apply to the Device
Under Test (DUT). Considering the necessity of evaluating the device behavior
in the radiation environment, we performed the radiation test on a Xilinx Kintex7
SRAM-based FGPA device using first-ever availbe Ultra High Energy(UHE) HI
beam, defined as ions in the 5-150 GeV/n range, provided in CERN.
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Fig. 5.1 SEU in configuration memory may corrupt circuit design mapped on FPGA
5.2 Background
The high sensitivity of SRAM cells against SEE induced by radiation effects with
respect to the its important role in SRAM-based FPGA, SEUs in configuration
memory are becoming one of the main reasons of errors and misbehavior. As it is
represented in Figure 5.1, one SEU(bitflip) in the configuration memory, depending
where such bit is used to configure the resources in devices such as Look Up
Table(LUT) and Programmable Interconnection Point(PIP), may corrupt the circuit
implemented on the device.
There are many methods for mitigating SEUs in configuration memory, such as
traditional redundancy based solutions and various configuration memory scrubbing
techniques. Triple Modular Redundancy (TMR) as one of the most popular fault
tolerant techniques has numerous implementations and variations. As for SRAM-
based FPGA manufactured by Xilinx, a Xilinx TMR tool [73] is available to
implement TMR automatically on a design which triplicates the logic paths and other
sequential elements including Flip Flops (FFs) and block memories together with
automatic voters insertions, as it is shown in Figure 5.2.
The XTMR implementation provides a fine granularity SET mitigation in config-
uration memory as long as two replicates if same logic path segment are affected by
SEUs in configuration memory, the circuit design is still able to carry out normal
function. For example, in Figure 5.2, if location 1 and location 2 are affected by
SEUs simultaneously, the design works correctly. On the others side, if location 2 and
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Fig. 5.2 SEUs in configuration memory affects different copies of logic path in XTMR
implementation
location 3 are affected by SEUs, the design generates wrong results for the segment
which may propagate through the while circuit design causing system misbehavior.
The second traditional methodology is known as configuration memory scrubbing.
This methodology is refreshing or rewriting the configuration memory with the
correct bitstream periodically or triggered by some detection mechanism. The
important point of theses technique is to define when and how the rewriting is
performed in a way to not interrupt the function of the design frequently. For
example, to not interrupt the functionality of the design when the error rate cross-
section could satisfy the reliability requirement posted by application constraints.
Several strategies have been used for triggering configuration memory scrubbing.
The most common one is blind scrubbing which is not involved with any error detec-
tion mechanism. Therefore, it rewrites the configuration memory periodically and it
is critical to determine the frequency of the scrubbing which should be calculated
relying on the error rate cross-section data of the device and design in the target
environment. More sophistic and complicated scrubbing techniques exploit other
features of the devices and circuit design itself, for example in [74], the scrubbing is
done in frame instead if the whole configuration memory by exploiting the partial
reconfiguration capability of the device. In [75], scrubbing is scheduled according
to the criticality of the hardware task so that a better trade-off between the system
reliability and scrubbing overhead could be achieved. Therefore, for optimizing the
scrubbing rate for reducing system availability overhead, error detection of SEU in
configuration memory should be applied. One simple error rate detection mechanism
could be applied by exploiting features such as the Frame Error Correcting Code
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(ECC) and Soft Error Mitigation (SEM) IP provided by Xilinx for its SRAM-based
FPGA devices. The error rate cross-section data of DUT in the target environment is
highly beneficial for better trade-off of performance and desired system reliability
against SEE induced by radiation effects. Radiation test as one of the methods for
gathering the error rate cross-section data are quite popular among academic and
commercial projects for evaluating different devices and designs to be deployed in
space applications.
Several radiation test have been performed and the data of these radiation test
are available in literature with different types of electronic devices and different
radiation beam recipes. Regarding SRAM-based FPGA devices, several radiation
test have been performed. For example, [76] reports the test results performed on
Xilinx Virtex-5 FPGA under both neutron and proton radiation beam in different
facilities. Xilinx Kintex-7 FPGA has been tested under proton beam and the results
are reported in [77]. [74] is reporting the data of the radiation test performed on
Xilinx Virtex-5 FPGA under neutron beam evaluating a Frame-Level Redundancy
Scrubbing (FLR-scrubbing) techniques.
5.3 Device and Design Under the Test
We performed a radiation test on Xilinx Kintex-7 SRAM-based FPGA using Ultra
High Energy heavy ion test beam for the first time available at the radiation center of
CERN.
During the radiation test, a Xilinx Kintex7 FPGA KC705 Evaluation Kit equipped
with a Kintex7 XC7K325T SRAM-based FPGA was used as DUT. The same as
radiation test that had been performed on Xilinx Virtex5 [76], an ARM-based
SoC, as illustrated in Figure 5.3, was used as benchmark circuit which contains
an ARM Cortex-M0 processor provided by ARM as flattened netlist through Uni-
versity Program, a UART peripheral as input and output device, a block memory
implementation via Xilinx BRAM IP for holding software code and data and a clock
generator to convert the differential clock source on board to a single end clock
signal in system. The UART and BRAM component are attached to an AHB-Lite
bus as same as Cortex-M0 processor.
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Fig. 5.3 Original ARM-based SoC used as benchmark circuit
However, with respect to the Virtex-5 device used in previous radiation test,
Kintex-7 has much larger amount of resources [78]. Therefore, in order to maintain
the utilization of the resource to capture as many effects as possible during the test,
the ARM based SoC was replicated multiple times which is represented in Figure 5.4.
Two version of the ARM-based SoC have been implemented:
1. Plain version: the original ARM-based SoC replicated for 50 copies on kintex7
device.
2. XTMR version: based on Plain version with Xilinx TMR applied, replicated
for 10 copies.
Table 5.1 is reporting the hardware utilization for both versions. As it is noticeable,
the resource overhead by XTMR implementation is as high as 400%. This overhead
is because of the extra voters inserted and more complicated routing caused by three
replicated logic paths and voter connections.
Please notice that ∗_SoC is the utilization data for one copy in the final design,
∗_x50 and _x10 means the original ARM SoC is replicated 50 and 10 times for Plain
and XTMR version respectively. +Utilization of LUTs for each copy in the final
design has a small difference among them due to later place and route stage.
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Fig. 5.4 Replication scheme of ARM-based SoC for increasing device utilization
Table 5.1 Resource utilization for Plain and XTMR Version of ARM-based SoC on Kintex-7
Version LUT[#] LUT[%] FF[#] FF[%] BRAM[#] BRAM[%]
plain_SoC∗ ∼+3.907 ∼+1.91 1.189 0.29 4 0.89
plain_x50∗∗ 195.074 95.72 59.460 14.59 200 44.94
XT MR_SoC∗ ∼+18.760 ∼+9.20 9.057 2.22 12 2.70
XT MR_x10∗∗ 187.557 92.03 90.572 22.22 120 26.97
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As it is presented in Figure 5.4, since the number of pins that can be used and
monitored during the radiation test is limited, for the last design in DUT, the plain
and the XTMR version have their replicas outputs ANDed together to reduce the
number of pins in the final design. Therefore, as long as one of the replica generated
an error in the output signal, the error will propagate to the output of the top-level
design and captured by the monitor during the test.
For the program running on the ARM processor, a bubble sort application was
implemented to generate the ascending and descending sorted results of a pre-defined
array in the code, which were sent to UART component in the design as output. The
application is executed in a deadloop to continuously generate output to be monitored
from outside.
5.4 Monitoring setup
Apart of Kintex-7 board, Zybo board [79] is used to monitor the DUT outputs along
with a custom designed Host PC application. After the initialization of the test, the
Host PC application will program the monitor board which is the Zybo board to
initialize the UART component to continuously monitor the outputs from DUT and
program DUT to start the run loop. During the run time, the monitor board keeps
checking the UART outputs from DUT and compare them with the golden copy
captured and stored before radiation test (fault free output). In the case of a mismatch,
Host PC application will be notified by monitor board and starts the configuration
memory readback procesure of DUT and after the UART log data transferred from
monitor board to Host PC and stored, the UART monitors in monitor board are reset
and a new run starts as represented in Figure 5.5. During each run, the Kintex-7
DUT is reprogrammed to clear out any SEU in configuration memory accumulated
in previous run.
5.5 UHE Heavy Ion beam
The Xe heavy ion beam is used for the radiation test with the energy level set to 40GeVn
and the effective LET is 3.7MeV∗cm
2
mg obtained by FLUKA [80] while considering
the volume around 1µm3. The particles with such high energy level is capable to
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Fig. 5.5 Monitor flow with the Host PC application
Fig. 5.6 board and beam setup for alignment.
penetrate the device with package, and possible to generate Single Event Multiple
Upsets(SEMU) in the configuration memory.
A logbook containing the beam information regarding number of particles hitting
the devices along with timestamps during the radiation test is provided so that it
is possible to correlate the error detected during the test and number of particles
afterward for calculating the error rate cross-section. The board and beam setup has
been shown in Figure 5.6.
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Fig. 5.7 VERI_Place error rate comparison with radiation test data for plain version
5.6 Radiation Test Data
5.6.1 Error rate analysis
In order to provide the Error Rate analysis, we used a tool developed in house
[81], which is responsible for performing design application error rate prediction
for SRAM-based FPGA with respect to SEU in configuration memory induced by
radiation effects and improvement of design reliability without introducing hardware
resources overhead. The hardening techniques used in this methodology has been
verified considering the previous radiation test that has been performed in our group
for prediction of error rate [76].
The application error rate is defined as the probability of application generating
an error at the output with respect to the certain number of SEU accumulated in
the configuration memory. Figure 5.7 is representing the comparison between the
radiation test data and VERI-Place prediction for Plain version while Figure 5.8 is
dedicated to the comparison for the XTMR version.
As it can be concluded from Figures 5.7 and 5.8, the prediction made by the
VERI-Place tool is accurate. The minor observed offset is due to the factor that the
high energy particles hitting the device may generate SEMU and the beam provided
at CERN was operating as spilling mode. To elaborate more, the beam was provided
periodically as a burst of particles is directed to strike the device. Therefore, it leads
to over counting of SEUs in configuration memory during the radiation test.
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Fig. 5.8 VERI_Place error rate comparison with radiation test data for XTMR version
Fig. 5.9 VERI_Place error rate comparison between the Plain and XTMR version collected
during radiation test
As a next step, we compared the radiation test data of a Plain and XTMR versions.
As it can be observed in Figure 5.9, XTMR has lower error rate when number of
SEUs accumulated in the configuration memory is relatively low. However, when
the number of SEUs increases, the error rate of XTMR version goes higher than the
plain version. This result is reasoned by large resource overhead in XTMR version
which can provide larger sensitive area or bits in configuration memory. On the
other side, it shows that when XTMR is complimented with other techniques such
as configuration memory scrubbing to avoid SEU accumulation in configuration
memory, XTMR version can achieve quite low error rate.
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Fig. 5.10 Application and configuration memory error-rate cross-section comparison for
Plain and XTMR versions.
Moreover, the application error rate cross-section defined as the probability of
a particle striking the device generating an error in the output, together with the
configuration memory error rate cross-section which is the probability of a particle
striking the device generates a SEU in the configuration memory are reported in
Figure 5.10.
The application error rate cross-section depends on the circuit design and in
this case the software running on the soft-core Cortex-M0 processor. On the other
hand, the configuration memory error rate cross-section is dependent to the device.
Therefore, as it is represented in figure 5.10, it is similar between the Plain and
XTMR version. Also XTMR version is able to achieve the application error rate
cross-section 65.9% lower than the Plain version.
5.6.2 Observation of SEMU
After the radiation test, readback data files of the configuration memory were col-
lected for each for Plain and also XTMR version. From the binary readback file,
frame data has been extracted in order to find the actual SEUs occurred in the config-
uration memory during the test. During our test, we focused on the configuration
memory. Therefore, the mask file was used to remove the dynamic content. For
example, Block RAM in the readback file which is described in details in [82].
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By analyzing the location and position of SEUs in the configuration memory,
several patterns have been recognized as multiple upsets occurred close to each
other forming a cluster which is providing the possibility to be an actual SEMU
occurrences.
Two bit in the configuration memory are defined as close when they reside in
the same major column and the distance is calculated following equation 5.1 is less
than
√
2. Similar Multiple Bit Upset(SMBU) have been seen in reports of previous
radiation test with lower energy [83], [84].
dist(a,b) =
q
(LFA(a)−LFA(b))2+(BitO f f set(a)+BitO f f set(b))2 (5.1)
In this equation, LFA is the Linear Frame Address in readback data while BitOffset
is the bit offset within the frame.
Figure 5.11 is representing the pattern found by analyzing readback file. As it
can be concluded, event though the size of cluster can go up to 6 and up to 3 adjacent
bits in the same frame may be corrupted at the same time, no cluster across three
frames has been observed while Figure 5.12 is representing the distribution of the
clusters of different sizes including the isolated bitflip for example cluster size 1 for
both Plain and XTMR version.
The cross-section is calculated as number of clusters of certain sized divided by
the number of particles passed through the device across all the runs for both Plain
and XTMR version during the radiation test. Table 5.2 is reporting the previous
radiation test data [84], which has been performed at the same LET as this test but
with Si ion beam. However, the Xe ion beam has much higher LET leading to much
higher bitflip cross-section.
In our experiment, we observed cluster for larger size such as size 5 and 6
which is not observed in the experiment with lower energy level heavy ion beam.
Comparing with Si beam, distribution of larger cluster is higher with the Xe UHE
beam even though LET is lower. Considering Xe beam with lower energy, it is
important to notice the UHE beam LET is much lower. Therefore, UHE beam
present characteristics regarding SEMU effect which may not be trivial using lower
energy beam for accelerated radiation test and unfold data later for GCR spectra for
example the result from UHE beam could be closer to real scenario when application
under GCR radiation environment is considered.
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Fig. 5.11 Cluster (SEMU) patterns observed during radiation test.
Fig. 5.12 Cluster distribution cross-section of different cluster sizes.
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Table 5.2 Comparison with Test Result of Lower Energy Beam on Kintex-7
Si∗ Xe∗ Xe(UHE)
LET (MeV.cm
2
mg ) 4.35 49.3 3.7
CMem Bitflip Cross Section (#bit f lipparticle ) 3.8∗10−1 4.67∗10−3
% Cluster Size=1 90.1 64.0 88.66
% Cluster Size=2 8.7 23.0 10.85
% Cluster Size=3 0.6 4.1 0.22
% Cluster Size=4 0.2 3 0.20
% Cluster Size=5 - - 0.05
% Cluster Size=6 - - 0.02
Evaluating the occurrence of SEMU(cluster) and the cross-section(Probability)
is critical for analyzing system reliability against SEEs in configuration memory
induced by radiation effect. More importantly, when certain fault tolerant technique
is to be applied and evaluated. For example, the configuration memory scrubbing
methods [85], [86] and ECC based techniques such as built-in FrameECC in Xilinx
Kintex-7 FPGA devices [74], may not be suffiecent alone with large clusters occurs
corrupting multiple hits across different frame.
Considering XTMR solution, please notice that the SEMU poses further obstacles
as it the place and route of three logic path replications did not take into account the
possibility of SEMU, there is a chance two bits in the configuration memory close
to each other control two of the logic paths of the same segment, which means one
single particle hitting the device leads the cluster corrupt which cause the circuit
design to face an error. The developed VERI-Place tool is able to improve the
design reliability, by modifying the place and route of design. Therefore, the final
configuration memory contains reduced number of sensitive bits considering also
SEMU. To summary, we performed a radiation test on Xilinx Kintex-7 SRAM-based
FPGA using UHE heavy ion beams available at CERN. The error rate analysis and
comparison with error rate prediction performed by the VERI-Place tool shows that
the XTMR version of design is able to achieve a well reduced sensitivity against
SEUs in configuration memory induced by radiation effects. The overall application
error rate cross-section of XTMR is 65.9% lower than the plain version.
Moreover, SEMUs have been observed as clusters of different sizes in the config-
uration memory readback file, which means further actions may need to be taken
to cope with the possibility of multiple upsets in configuration memory corrupting
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multiple resources in the circuit design at the same time, for instance two logic path
replicas in XTMR implementation.
5.7 EUCLID Space Mission
5.7.1 What is EUCLID?
EUCLID is a cosmology mission with the goal to study the geometry and the nature
of the dark universe, dark matter and dark energy. The mission will investigate the
distance-redshift relation and the evolution of the cosmic structures by measuring
shapes and redshift of distant galaxies. EUCLID space segment will be spacecraft
placed into an orbit around L2(around 1.5 million kilometers from earth) with
a coverage of 15,000 deg2in 6.25 years with step and stare observation strategy.
The launch of the spacecraft is planned for 2020. EUCLID spacecraft will host 2
instruments:
1. Near Infrared Spectrometer Photometer (NISP)
2. VISible Imager (VSI)
Both instruments take advantages of functions implemented in FPGA devices
while the controller part of the units are adopting RTAX devices, the elaboration part
is essentially adopting Radiation Tolerant ProASIC Flash-based FPGA technology
which are widely used in space application in both NASA and ESA mission because
of the high level of immunity to radiation effects. For this device family in particular,
the technology is guaranteed to:
• Single Event Latchup(SEL) immune up to 68 MeV/cm2/mg
• Total Ionizing Dose(TID) better than 30 Krad
• F/F with TMR
• No SEU effects are expected in the configuration memory
Considering these features, we identify a radiation profile that has been character-
ized as the maximum exposure of 4krad which leads to the generation of SET pulses
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with duration between 0.43 ns and 0.52 ns. In order to perform radiation hardening
of FPGA design in ProASIC, several steps have been identified:
• Radiation Hardening at RTL level
• Radiation Hardening of the I/Os
• TMR of F/Fs
• Static Timing Analysis (STA)
• Applying SETA flow
Considering the mentioned steps, the radiation hardened steps starts from the
original netlist. The netlist has been implemented using VHDL while TMR has been
applied to all the Flip-Flops. The netlist with the TMR Flip-Flops passed through
place and route performed with Microsemi Designer. As a next phase, Static Timing
Analysis(STA) has been performed. By performing the functional verification with
test-bench on the Post-layout netlist, the netlist has been provided to SETA flow in
order to perform the SET analysis and mitigation based on the performed analysis.
The EDA tool that we developed named as SETA and applied to EUCLID space
mission project is represented in Figure 5.13.
The flow that is illustrated in Figure 5.13 has been applied to EUCLID netlsit.
The iteration showed in the Figure 5.13 has been performed several times. To
elaborate more, we need to run the tool for several iterations to overcome timing
failure and fulfill the timing requirements. The tool starts with the commercial tool
which is this case it is and implemented Microsemi Libero SoC 11.8 and extract
the Post-layout Verilog netlist, AFL and PDC files. From this information, as a
first iteration, SETA evaluates the impact of SETs on the circuit functionality by
calculating the SET propagation in all the circuit nodes and the maximal SET pulse
width at the input of each Flip-Flop. This information is reported in the SET report
from SET analysis. This report is provided to mitigation tool which is focusing on
the filtering of the SET reaching to the Flip-Flops by inserting Guard-Gates(GGs).
The following concept is classified in three phases: The First phase reporting the SET
sensitivity analysis of EUCLID original netlist. The second phase is for elaboration
of the steps for mitigating the netlist. The third phase is dedicated to SET analysis of
the mitigated netlist.
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Fig. 5.13 The EDA adapted flow integrates both commercial tool (Micsosemi Libero Soc
11.8) and the SET analysis and mitigation flow.
Table 5.3 Circuit Resources of the EUCLID netlist by type
Type Core Tiles[#]
Combinational Logic 30,190
Sequential Elements(Flip-Flops) 17,718
5.7.2 Analysis of EUCLID original EUCLID netlist sensitivity to
SET
The EUCLID netlist has been provided to the developed EDA tool. Table5.3 is
reporting the resource usage of the EUCLID netlist while Table5.4 is reporting the
timing characteristics.
In Table5.4, the component CLK_60M, CLK_20M, CLK_60M_bu f f and CLK_30M
are the components in the design corresponding to different clock domains whose fre-
quencies are as is it represented in the name, while SPW_CT LR0 and SPW_CT RL1
are two SpaceWire controllers implemented in the design.
Considering the radiation profile features, it has been defined that the expected
SET pulses have width equal to 0.519ns, 0.488ns, 0.462ns and 0.437ns. Theses SET
pulses have been provided to SETA as inputs in order to perform a SET sensitivity
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Table 5.4 Timing resources of the EUCLID netlist
Reference name Period[ns] Frequency[MHz]
CLK_60M 12.097 82.665
CLK_20M 30.156 33.161
SPW_CT LR0 11.177 89.469
SPW_CT RL1 13.437 74.421
CLK_60M_bu f f 12.097 82.665
CLK_30M 28.022 35.686
Table 5.5 Single Event Transient Analysis for SET Ranging from 0.43 sn to 0.52 ns repre-
senting the number of Flip-Flops for each case
Source SET[ns] Totally Filtered[#] Partially Filtered[#] Broadened[#]
0.520 11,130 0 6,542
0.488 11,130 0 6,542
0.4462 11,130 0 6,542
0.437 11,162 6,510 0
analysis and report the sensitive node location. Table5.5 is reporting the result of
SETA tool regarding the sensitivity of EUCLID design. In this table, Totally Filtered
is reporting the number of Flip-Flops which are facing the SET pulses that during
their propagation, the pulses have been totally filtered. Please note that these number
of Flip-Flops is not including the Flip-Flops implemented for I/Os; Partially Filtered
is dedicated to SET pulses propagating up to Flip-Flops while the width of the
pulses have been reduced but not completely filtered which leads to lower probability
of the pulses being sampled; broadened is representing the pulses that during the
propagation, the width of the pulses have been increased during the propagation.
This case is introducing the most critical situation since by increasing the width
of the pulse, the probability of the pulse being sampled by the storage element is
increasing.
The computational time required for performing SET analysis considering the
three input SET pulses is approximately 65 hours. Please notice that, firstly, the
resource used area on A3P3000RT is 63.65% and the required time depends on the
computer performance that has been used for executing the tool. In our case, we
used a VirtualBox machine on the mid-range laptop PC, while considering running
the tool on a more powerful workstation/server, the computational time should be
able to shorten more.
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Fig. 5.14 The SET distribution obtained on the original EUCLID netlist.
The SET distribution is reported in Figure 5.14. In this figure, the horizontal axis
is representing the ID of the Flip-Flops in the original netlist that are partially filtered
or broadened, while the vertical axis shows the maximal SET pulse width reaching
the corresponding Flip-Flops. It can be observed from the Figure that for SET pulses
with short duration such as 0.43ns, the source SETs have been electrically filtered
before or they are not broadened while propagating through the logics and routing
nets of the circuit, before reaching to the FLip-Flops. It means that the SET pulse
reaching to the Flip-Flops are almost the same width as the source SETs. This
phenomena is dependent to the used technology and its behavior regarding SET
pulse.
Differently, when the source SET pulses have longer duration such as 0.52ns,
the SET pulses are facing a drastic increasing of the width of SET pulses during
the propagation of the pulse through the circuits. This means that the probability of
SET pulses being sampled by the storage elements is increasing which leads to more
critical condition for the mission.
5.7.3 Mitigating the EUCLID design netlist
By performing the SET analysis and identifying the sensitive nodes of the EUCLID
circuits, the report of SET sensitivity and the netlist have been provided to the
mitigation tool. Based on these two files, the mitigation tool inserts the G logic gates
5.7 EUCLID Space Mission 133
Fig. 5.15 An example of Gaurd-Gate automation insertion on a portion of the EUCLID
design.
for filtering the SETs. Figure 5.15 is illustrating an example of GG insertion within
the EUCLID design.
In order to mitigate the EUCLID design, based on the analysis report, we set
the filtering capability of Guard-Gate mitigation to 1.350ns. By this value, we
provide the maximal broadening reduction and filter all the SET pulses reported
as by the analysis tool before reaching to the Flip-Flops. Although this filtering
capability is efficient for removing all propagated SETs, it does not fulfill timing
requirements regarding 30 MHz clock domain and the timing closure for this domain
fails. Therefore, as a next step, we decrease the Guard-Gate mitigation insertion
to 1.2ns. However, the timing closue regarding 30MHz clock domain fails again.
As the last step, we decrease the Guard-Gate mitigation insertion down to 1.0ns
maximal broadening reduction. As a result we success the timing closure for all
clock domains. Table 5.6 reports the three iterations of Guard Gate mitigation tool,
implementation and timing analysis. Moreover, Table 5.7 reports the area overhead
of these three iteration. As it can be observed from the table, using our approach,
it is affecting the high frequency domains. In fact, the performance is the same as
plain implementation(Original Version).It is interesting to mention that the frequency
drop of the clock domain at 60MHz(CLK60) for the EUCLID TMR implementation
is due to the placement and routing algorithm not implementing any specific rules
as instead requested for a TMR implementation(for example redundancy domain
should be placed close to each voter partition). On the other side, the EUCLID
TMR+GG includes placement constraints to force the timing characteristics of each
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Table 5.6 Timing analysis for three iteration of Guard-Gate mitigation tool
Reference Name
Guard Gate Delay Coefficient
1.4 ns 1.2 ns 1.0 ns
Frequency[MHz]-4krad
CLK_60M 69,845 68,304 69,793
CLK_20M 36,480 32,234 35,045
SPW_CTRL0 76,430 74,234 79,764
SPW_CTRL1 81,832 80,024 83,043
Clk_60M_buff 61,430 64,780 69,793
Clk_30M 27,640 29,550 31,248
Table 5.7 Area Over-head Report for Three Iteration of Guard Gate Mitigation Tool
Guard Gate Delay Coefficient[ns] Area Over-head[%]
1.4 8
1.2 3.8
1.0 1.4
Guard-Gate structure. Therefore, it maintains the timing property almost equal to
the original design.
Regarding the netlist usage, Table 5.8 is reporting the netlist resource usage
for the last iteration. As it can be observed, a maximal number of 4 INVDs per
Guard-Gate has been inserted for a total of 708 INVD.
5.7.4 Analysis of EUCLID mitigated netlist sensitivity to SET
phenomena
The original netlist has been evaluated regrading SET sensitivity using SETA tool. To
elaborate more, we applied the SETA tool to evaluate the sensitivity of the mitigated
Table 5.8 Circuit Resources for the Mitigation Netlist
Type Core Tile[#]
Combinational Logic 30,190
INVD gates(GG Structure) 708
NAND gates(GG Structure) 396
Total Combinational Logic 31,294
Sequential Elements(FFs) 17,718
5.7 EUCLID Space Mission 135
Fig. 5.16 The SET distribution obtained on the Mitigated EUCLID netlist.
circuit regarding SET pulses with the duration between 0.43 ns and 0.5 ns. Figure
5.16 illustrates the SET distribution of the mitigated netlist. AS it is shown, the SET
pulses below 0.4 ns will be electrically filtered before reaching the Flip-Flops inputs.
After performing sensitivity evaluation of mitigated netlist regarding SET pulse,
we performed a comparison between the mitigated netlist and the original one. As it
can be observed in Figure 5.17, mitigating the netlist results in removal of 97% of
broadened SETs while the 3% remains with reduced pulse width around 50%. As an
example, a pulse with the width fo 3.2 ns in the original netlist has been partially
filtered down to 1.9 ns in the mitigated version.
The CRÈME96 [87] and the developed SETA tool are applied to evaluate the EU-
CLID circuit SET sensitivity in terms of error cross-section for the two most resilient
versions: our approach and the previous state-of-the-art solution with the TMR and
SET filtering. To elaborate more, we evaluate the expected integral influence for
the nominal duration of the mission as 6.25 years. For performing the SET error
estimation, we normalized the CRÈME96 data for each single ProASIC3 Versatile
and routing segment. The SET normalized cross-section coefficients have been
elaborated with the SET tool applied to the Post-layout netlist of the target design.
For the unmitigated version, we aquired a normalized transient error cross-section
of 1.77E-4 while for the mitigated version(TMR+GG), we achieved a normalized
transient error cross-section of 2.42E-7.
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Fig. 5.17 A comparison of SET distribution between the original netlist and the mitigated
netlist.
To summary, we developed a work-flow for evaluating the sensitivity of the
circuits regarding the SET pulses and applying an efficient mitigation solution based
on the performed analysis. This work-flow is applicable to industrial circuit as it has
been applied to ESA EUCLID space mission for monitoring the dark space. This
project is an industrial project carrying on by ESA and OHB with the lunching plan
at 2020. Experimental results demonstrated a reduction of three order of magnitude
of the overall SET sensitivity. Moreover, the mitigation of SET pulses is flexible
and it is possible to tuned the mitigating coefficient with respect to the design timing
characteristics.
Part II
From Transient to Permanent

Chapter 6
Micro Single Event Latch-up
Single Event Effects are considered as the effect of a single particle strike in a
specific location within the device which may cause different functional behaviors.
Depending on the strike location, time, the electrical field and the energy of the
particle , different behavior can be observed. This effects can be temporary faults
that affect the device for a certain period of time, known as Soft Errors. On the other
side, if the effect is permanent, it is defined as Hard Errors. One of the most critical
hard errors is Single Event Latch-up (SEL) [88]. SEL is one of the major reliability
concern for VLSI device applied to safety critical application such as aerospace
happening due to environmental radiation, includes one of the many PNPN structure
of the silicon to be switched from its blocking state to a latched start, resulting
in circuit malfunction [89]. Considering the reduction of circuit feature size and
operating voltage level, a new kind of phenomenon has attracted attention known as
Micro Single Event Latch-up (µSEL) [90].
SEL normally occures neat the input/output terminals of a logic gate where a
charged particle can pass through the silicon device region while µSEL occurs at
different location across the die and between layers inducing two different effects.
The first one is increasing the global current of the device. The second is the local
logical stuck of the involved signals that may provoke the propagation of the faults
to the circuit primary outputs. Due to the fact that µSEL is happening in any portion
of the device, detecting this effect is a challenging issue.
Micro SEL affect depends on several aspects such as: Layout, depth, size and
design density. Several studies evaluate these factors. Many works on the latch-
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up effect based on the injection of transient current using Technology Computer-
Aided Design (TCAD) simulation. However, due to the long simulation times, it
is not applicable to large designs. 3D-TCAD somulation is used in [91] to analyze
and harden SEL happening in embedded STAM-based FPGAs and a mitigation
approach on the cell geometry has been proposed. To elaborate more, simulation
results demonstrates that the extra source junction and source ties acquire the charge
collection, leading to the higher sensitivity regarding SEL. In [92], this factor has
been removed and TCAD simulation environment has been used for evaluation of this
phenomenon. IN [93], the effect of angular ions on the SEL cross section has been
evaluated. In [94], TCAD simulation highlights the impact of both angle and roll of
effects on the latch-up sensitivity showing a direct dependency of asymmetric layout
considering the parasitic latch-up circuit, which is normally electrically modeled
with SPIC model. Several works are dedicated to evaluate the impact of radiation
strikes on the generation of micro SEL effect [7] [95] [96] [97]. MUSCA SEP3
has been developed and used for modeling the basic mechanism that occurs when an
error happened due to radiation strike [97].
6.1 From SEL to Micro SEL
Single Event Latch-up has a permanent effect that leads to an increase of the device
current. This error leads to the destruction of the device itself it not removed in time.
As it is shown in Figure 6.1, besides the designed p and n transistor, additional
parasitic devices that are formed by interaction of different doped area. If a current
peak is injected in such a parasitic structure, because of its strong feedback net, a
chain reaction is triggering, creating a short circuit between ground and Vdd that
could burn down the device. A spurious current peak in the parasitic structures can
be injected by direct or indirect ionization by means of a particle that strike the
device in that area, starting the SEL effect [98]. Detection structures can be added
to the sensitive transistors, in order to detect SELs and clearing them, by means of
power cut off.
The latch-up current may only represent a small fraction of the normal overall
integrated circuit current consumption, which leads to the creation of a localized
latch-up also named Micro Single Event Latch-up (µSEL). In some cases, the energy
deposition can cause individual cells to be unable to change state until a power cycle
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Fig. 6.1 Electrical effect generating a SEL effect
Fig. 6.2 Overview of the basic mechanisms generating a micro SEL effect on the output of a
gate
is executed. These effects can cause fraction of bits to be unable to change state
due to the value of collected charge [99]. These effects are normally generated by
mico-dose deposition which are activated when the energy in a given region exceeds
a certain threshold value.
Figure 6.2, represents the basic mechanism of µSEL effect. At a certain time, the
particle incident cause transition of micro charge in terms of quantity that exceeds
the threshold of the effect. Therefore, triggering the effect. As a result,if affects the
resource within a given region, typically two nets or two cells on close metal layers
[22]. Therefore, a given portion of the circuit is on a stuck logic resource leading a
localized high current value.
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Fig. 6.3 The intra-metal layer micro-SEL effect between routing segment. The evidenced
red routes represents the affected net
the physical layout of the circuit, two-ground rails conductor separates routing
levels. Therefore, as a result of high charged particle interacting with the device,
the overall current of the following routing section is increasing. In a case that
the threshold of the current is reached, it may create a path with a low resistor
values. Therefore, a temporal micro latch-up is activated. Moreover, this effect is
propagating simultaneously in all the nets connected to the defected point forcing
all the global net to be stuck at the logic value of one or zero, based on the used
technology. Figure 6.3 represent this scenario while three routes in three different
metal layers are affected.
Therefore, in order to evaluate the sensitivity of the design under the study, we
develop a work flow based on the Monte Carlo method, taking into account the
design under the test, placement and routing architecture within the physical layer
mapping, in order to calculate the realistic micro SEL occurrences.
6.1.1 Micro Single Event Latch-up Analysis
In order to evaluate the sensitivity of sub-nanomicron circuit regarding µSEL, a
methodology has been proposed which is the first methodology dedicated to geomet-
rical layout analysis for the identification of the physical sensitive nodes and two
developed engines for providing the static and dynamic error rate.
This work flow consists of five groups of tools. Figure 6.4 represents the work
flow which starts with the classical IC design tool chain, going through synthesis,
place and route, moving toward the developed tool for physical design description,
the layer mapping and finally Monte Carlo algorithm. The combination of this
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Fig. 6.4 OVerview of the global analysis methodology for micro-latch up consisting on the
layer mesh-map and the micro-SEL insertion tool
group of tools elaborate the layout description in order to provide the estimation of
susceptibility of the design in terms of Error Rate.
The flow starts with the Hardware description of the design, VHDL of the design.
The Commercial tool elaborates the VHDL in order to generate the synthesized
netlist. The netlist has been used to generate the Physical Design Description(PDD)
which represent the circuit graph by means of logic vertex and edge. An a next step,
the placement and routing phase has been processed ny an ad-hoc physical layout too,
which creates the Graphic Data System (GDS) of the final design layout. Placement
has been done based on selection of the logic block location in order to provide the
optimized timing features. On the other side, for routing, the shortest interconnection
lines between logic elements has been selected. Therefore, GDS format for analyzing
the layer mapping of the design has been generated and provided to perform and
analysis on the layout.
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Micro Latch-up layout analysis
The main core of the developed work flow is the layout analysis. Layer mapping
starts with generating layers meshes. A set of 2D matrix is considered for defining
the layout while each 2D matrix is representing one layer of the layout. Then, the
GDS of the design has been connected with the developed layer mesh, in a way that
all used cubes of the GDS, has been filled to the corresponding positions in the mesh
layer. Therefore, all the used cubes of the meshes layers have been extracted. The
layout map contains all the placement of routing boundaries in each layer. From the
layer meshes, the area of the device which has been used for routing architecture
has been extracted and classified based on the layers which they belong to. If they
belong to two different layers, they have been classified as a shared point between
layers, which provides the possible location of micro-latchup event. Figure 6.5,
represent the pseudo code of the developed algorithm.
To elaborate more, the position that are mutual between different layers have
been defined. This positions can be the possible position of occurrence of µSEL.
However, not all the radiation incident at this common points can create the µSEL.
The radiation can cause an error only if the distance between layers are less than the
defined threshold [100]. The placement of the common points who are meeting this
threshold have been extracted which are adjacent enough to create µSEL effect with
respect to the LET of the particle.
Monte Carlo Algorithm
In order to evaluate the occurence of µSEL, a Monte Carlo based algorithm is
proposed and developed. The Monte Carlo algorithm generates distributions of
µSEL within all device area available for routing interconnections. The developed
environment of Monte Carlo algorithm is presentedin Figure 6.6.
The generated layout mapping together with Design Netlist Description(PDD
file) are imported by Monte Carlo algorithm. The Monte Carlo parameters defined
by user are introduced to the algorithm in terms of the µSEL Effect Rules. All the
routing cubes in each layer are considered as possible location for evaluating the
µSEL effect.
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Fig. 6.5 A Pseudo-code overview of the developed latch-up analysis environment
Fig. 6.6 The flow of the developed Monte Carlo Error Rate Analysis
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Monte Carlo stats with reading the 3D geometry of the layout of the design and
creates the layer mapping. Then, the analysis procedure is divided in to several steps.
Firstly, the latch up generation choose the position for evaluating the µSEL effect,
randomly. Moreover, in all the layers, this selected point is considered. For this
randomly selection, all the nodes of the design are volunteered and considered. The
algorithm is classifying the selected position. First of all, the algorithm controls
if the selected node is considered as the used area of the device. Second aspect is
related to the mutual point between routing interconnections in different layers. The
chosen node will be considered as a successful possible error node only if it is a
mutual node between different routing segments in different layers. This successful
point is considered as the possible location of µSEL. error even though it is not
determined.
The file containing the information related to the Netlist provides the data related
to the nets containing the selected point. If the chosen point meets the requirement
of the algorithm, the selected node is filtered based on the distance of the layers that
the node belongs to. with respect to the chosen threshold, which is related to the
design functionality, the selected nodes will be classified again.
Finally, if the chosen node does not meet the requirement of the µSEL effect,
the algorithm comes back to the initial step. Otherwise, if the chosen location is
considered as a possible µSEL location, the coordinates of the chosen point and
also the number of Monte Carlo run reported in the Micro Lacth up Error file and
the averahe number of runs has been updated at the end of each distribution. This
procedure continues until the difference between each average is lower than the
Monte Carlo Error defined by user as an effective rule and the result is reported as
the static fault report.
Moreover, the Monte Carlo algorithm generated a list of the nets which are
probable to generate µSEL in a case of radiation incident. The list of nets has been
used for performing the dynamic evaluation of the design through µSEL Error.
Error Rate Generation based on Simulation Environment
For generating Error Rate report, we generate a simulation environment that import
the affected net list generated by Monte Carlo algorithm, applying to a test bench to
provide in put stimuli and monitor the outputs to detect possible errors. The simula-
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tion environment is generating the Error Rate report automatically by calculating the
probability of detection error in the output when the reported nets are considered as
a µSEL position. As a result, the generated Error Rate report is providing an insight
of possible system behavior when the device is deployed in a radiation environment
and generates the µSEL error.
6.1.2 Experimental Results
In order to confirm the accuracy and efficiency of the developed algorithm, a bench-
mark circuit from ITC benchmark collection has been chosen [22]. WE choose
NaNGate 15nm Open Cell library used in combination with Synopsys Simplify PRO
and we used the back-end NaNGate cell description in order to implement the layout.
Experimental Setup
The goal of the proposed environment is to choose layout with different routing
congestion characteristics and test its impact on the µSEL sensitivity. Considering
the area of the device, an area equal to 100µm × 50µm ×. To provide the test
bench for the benchmark circuit in the simulation environment including the input
stimuli, the benchmark circuit is applied to Synopsys TetraMax tool to generated
the test pattern using ATPG to generate the test bench automatically. Afterwards,
the logic for monitoring the output with respect the golden output is added to the
test bench in order to detect errors. Finally, the faulty nets list generated from Monte
Carlo algorithm, post layout design netlist and the test bench were loaded in to the
simulation environment for computing Error Rate.
Monte Carlo Error Rate
For the selected benchmark circuit, six different routing architecture have been
defined. Each architecture has been generated by changing the routing congestion,
as shown in Table 6.1.
For each presented routing architecture, we start from the netlist of the design,
placement and routing have been performed which at the end provide the GDS II
format of the netlist. The map of each layer has been creating using GDS II format
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Table 6.1 Routing Architecture Characteristic
B14 Routing Architecture Average Routing Congestion[%]
A 33.72
B 32.97
C 34.88
D 41.63
E 52.56
F 62.11
Fig. 6.7 Mutual layer distribution in terms of are width and length for benchmark B14 version
F
of the netlist under the study. For each layer, the used area of the device has been
extracted from the layer map of the design. The process continues by investigation
of the layer distribution. Considering B14 as a selected testbench with routing
architecture type F, the mutual layers occurrences are reported with respect to the
device width and length is represented in Figure 6.7.
As it is shown in Figure 6.7, the distribution of the used area of the device
regarding different layers is reported while the number of layers with a mutual point
is defined. This information is required to identify the sensitive point of the design
since the position is mutual between more layers is more sensitive to the µSEL fault.
Please notice that the most sensitive are of the layout can be referred to the identified
spot observable directly on the metal layer 1 and 2, as shown in Figure 6.8 a for
the B14 benchmark, routing architecture type F. These location are drastically less
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Fig. 6.8 Metal Layers 1 and 2 for the B14 implementation with routing congestion F(a) and
routing congestion A(b)
Fig. 6.9 Monte Carlo fault report for the different B14 Physical placement and routing with
statistical error rate bar at 1%
congestioned. Therefore, less prone to µSEL phenomena than the correspondent
one for B14 benchmark for version A, as reported in Figure 6.8, b.
Monte Carlo algorithm use the layer map of the design to estimate the average
number of µSEL error and calculate the error rate. We evaluate the mean number
of µSEL error fixing the tolerated precision Error 1%. Figure 6.9 is reporting the
number of Monte Carlo run to reach the defined Monte Carlo error.
Dynamic Error Rate: Fault Simulation
For evaluating the µSEL effect on the circuit functionality, we design a set of fault
simulation experiments. For doing this, the list of the affected nets which is generated
from Monte Carlo algorithm is provided as an input of the simulation environment.
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Fig. 6.10 µSEL fault simulation instrumentation method
Table 6.2 Dynamic error rate report
Circuit Faulty Simulation[#] Observed Errors[#] Error Rate[%]
A 1656 1622 97.94
B 2318 2242 96.72
C 2261 2201 97.346
D 3069 2981 97.132
E 4570 4446 97.286
F 4767 4624 97
The affected list of the nets provides the information related to the event which
has been involved in the µSEL, successfully. Please note that the fault simulation
tool is not able to directly simulate the µSEL effect. Therefore, we developed a
simulation tool considering the propagation scenario, represented in Figure 6.10. To
elaborate more, when a sensitive node is affected by a µSEL, it leads the propagation
point of the routing branches to be simultaneously stuck at the positive logic value.
The developed simulation environment use the faulty net list with the layout
netlist of the target design in order to generate the Error-rate Error. A testbench
is used to apply the input stimuli to the target design, monitoring the output to
compare with the golden output and record the occurrence of errors. Error rate is
generated in terms of numbers of simulation runs where errors in the output have
been detected, as reported in Table 6.2. The results confirm that the criticality of
the µSEL phenomena, since almost all the single µSEL leads to the whole circuit
misbehavior.
6.1.3 Research advancement on Micro Single Event Latch-up
Ultra-scale devices based on technologies below 20nm are nowadays widely adopted
due to their elevated computing features and low power consumption. Using these
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devices, one of the main challenges is the protection against the micro latch-up effect.
Therefore, a new analysis too for detecting the occurrence of micro latch-up event
considering the physical layout of a circuit has been proposed. In details, a circuit
layers has been developed in order to identify the micro latch-up sensitive points in
the 3D layout geometry, while a Monte-Carlo approach has been developed to calcu-
late the micro latch-up error rate on routing interconnection nodes. Experimental
results have been performed by fault simulation on a benchmark circuit implemented
in six different variants of routing congestion using a 15 nm COTS technology library
demonstrating the feasibility of the proposed approach. As a next step, radiation
test is planned in order to confirm the occurrence of the micro single event latch-up
phenomenon. and analyzing the traditional mitigation approach and compare the
results with different nano-metric technologies.
Chapter 7
Total Ionizing Does
Different from Single Event Effects, Total Ionizing Dose(TID) is the effect of the
accumulation of the charge imposed by secondary particles interacting within the
device. The amount of the accumulated charge depends on the exposure time, the
flux of the particles and their LET. TID can cause several misbehavior of the system.
Firstly, it cause a global worsening of the device since, it is a trapped effect in the
silicon oxide of the transistor which cause the transistors to slow down and increases
the power consumption of the device. Secondly, TID can increase the sensitivity of
the system regarding SEU [3]. To elaborate more, the accumulated charge and the
displacement damage within the crystal lattice of the device could make the device
more sensitive to Single Events. Sometimes, the device can recover from TID effect
rapidly. On the other side, at some cases it takes months for TID to anneal. However,
one common method for annealing TID effect is heating the device. Heating provides
enough energy to the crystalline lattice so that atomic locations can be restored and
trapped charges can be released.
Considering recent technology such as Flash-based FPGAs, even though these
devices are attracting interest fur to their high flexibility, high computing power and
low power consumption, they are still subjected to cumulative TID effect, especially
when they are used in mission critical applications [101] [102]. Therefore, in order
to reach a successful mission, it is mandatory to evaluate the operation of our
system while it is affected by TID and mitigate the system at early stage of systems
development.
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Several studies are dedicated to evaluate the TID effect, focusing on Flash-based
FPGA devices. In [103][104], a TID experiment has been performed by exposing
the Microsemi ProASIC3 Flash-based FPGA with two design under gamma rays.
The first design is a chain of 2000 inverters while the second one is a chain of 2000
shift registers. As a result, they observed a degradation of 10% in propagation delay.
In [105], the characterization of TID effect on Microsemi PRoASIC3 Flash-based
FPGAs has been performed. For this characyerization, X-Ray and Gama rays has
been imposed to the chains of designs included chains of inverters and shift registers.
In [2] the inverters and shift registers have been replaced with other kind of logic
gates. As a result, it has been reported that the propagation delay degradation in
dependent to the type of implemented logic gates.
In [106], the result of TID effect analysis of Flash-based FPGA are reported
which illustrates for each component use din the system its accumulated dose before
failure with comparison between design with and without reconfiguration. Recent
Radiation-hardened Technology, RTG4 Flash-bases FPGA, have been analyzed
regarding TID effect and the result are published at [107] [108]. All the mentioned
studies, are based on physical way such as accelerated particle beam and X-ray
to induce TID to the device under the test and analyze the overall performance
degradation of the device. However, all this approaches are sharing a common
disadvantages which is: firstly, the cost of TID analysis experiment in terms of
money and time. Secondly, the granularity of the analysis results is not optimal for
fine optimization of the design with reliability as an important constraint.
Therefore, we propose a new work-flow for analyzing the TID effect on Flash-
based FPGA, taking into account different types of gates as reported in [2] and
generating an error rate reports of the target design automatically at the early stage
of the development. Moreover, the environment is also evaluating the performance
degradation as a result of TID effect not only in programmable logic cores but also
in the routing resources.
7.1 The developed environment
We proposed a new environment for analyzing the TID effect on Flash-base FPGA
considering the different impact of factor when the configurable logic is programmed
to implement different logics in the design. The developed environment is divided in
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Fig. 7.1 The flow of the developed TID analysis environment
four phases: Firstly, a set of TID heatmaps is generated with respect to the radiation
environment profile which is describing possible TID effect distribution. Secondly,
we export information from the implemented design, including Physical Design
Constraints(PDCs) file, the Simulation Delay File(SDF) and Post-layout netlist.
The workflow continues with generation of Hitlist files describing the performance
degradation with respect to the logic gates in the target design. Finally, the SDF file
and Post-layout netlist are provided to simulation environment in order to produce
error rate report for designer to gain an early stage reliability estimation of the target
design regarding TID effects. Figure 7.1 represents the developed environment.
7.1.1 Background on Versatile architecture
Since the proposed work-flow is dedicated to Flash-based FPGAs with Versatile as
a programmable logic core [1], it is beneficial to overview this architecture before
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Fig. 7.2 VersaTile in Microsemi ProASIC Flash-based FPGA [1]
elaborating the proposed work-flow. Figure 7.2 represent the propgrammable logic
core of Flash-based FPGAs.
Different circuits in the VersaTile can be generated by implementing different
logic functions and changing the on/off state of the switches. Considering different
number of involved switched for different logic gates, the performance degradation
caused by the same TID could be different in terms of propagation delay increment.
This is performed as Performance Degradation Model(PDModel) in our proposed
environment.
7.1.2 Total Ionizing Dose (TID) Heatmap generation
Total Ionizing Dose(TID) effect is dependent to the amount of radiation accumulation
in the whole device. Although, because of the variation of the silicon parameters,
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Fig. 7.3 Heatmap generation considering TID distribution: The area A represent a high
density TID region, while area B is representing a TID not affecting region.
the accumulated radiation in the device is not homogeneous. Thus, we generate
TID Heatmap in order to model the distribution of localized TID effect. This
model has been developed in Matlab environment with the goal to provide the
correlation between the radiation incident and TID effect within the device. In this
modeling, a Gaussian model is used in order to estimate the particle distribution
while interacting within the device. This model is receiving the dimension of the
device, the radiation profile and the total dose determined by the radiation profile.
Then, it selects randomly a hotspot location in the device which is defined as the
location that charges are expected to accumulate more densely. Figure 7.3 as an
example of the device Heatmap evaluating the TID distribution, illustrates that are A
of the device as an affected cell suffers from the performance degradation of the cell
while cell located in area B of the device work at the original speed.
The scheme of the developed work-flow is represented in Figure 7.4. The
algorithm goes on with the elaborating the characteristics of the device under the
study such as device size and generates a simplified FPGA map. IT continues with
selecting several hotspot as sensitive points of the device. For each selected hotspot,
the TID effect is modeled considering the progressive energy accumulation induced
by the particles, whose profile is specified by two parameters, namely Particle
Quantity and Particle Energy. Moreover, we define a dynamic TID coefficient to
map the discharged energy of the particle to the absorbed energy by the devices and
eventually the TID considering the Gaussian particles since the TID is accumulated
non-linearly. Likewise, the algorithm sets intermediate observation point while TID
has been accumulated to the final target dose specified by the user in order to provide
a better granularity for analyzing the performance.
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Fig. 7.4 Block diagram of TIC Heatmap generation
Along with the Heatmap, depend on the radiation environment profile and target
FPGA device profile, a PDModel is developed. The PDModel consists in: Firstly, the
propagation delay model within the VersaTile considering the logic implemented in
the design. Secondly, a propagation delay model for the routing resources connecting
the logic functions among different VersaTiles used in the design. These two models
are adopted as increment of path delay inside the gates and port to port delay
among different gates respectively during the phases of Hitlist generation and SDF
instrumentation.
7.1.3 Hitlist generation
With respect to the PDModel and generated TID heatmaps, a set of Hitlists is
generated which is describing the performance degradation caused by TID effects in
each cell of the design. The generated Hitlist files follow the mechanism used in the
SDF to annotate timing information of the target design. Therefore, our developed
environment is receiving the original SDF generated by Mircosemi Libero tools uses
IOPATH directive to annotate the delay from input port to output port inside a cell
and PORT directive to annotate propagation delay of the net from port of a cell to
port of another cell. Therefore, the Hitlis file adopt the similar names to mark the
delay increment of affected gates and net paths. Figure 7.5 is representing the pseudo
code of the developed algorithm for generating the Hitlist.
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Fig. 7.5 Algorithm for generation Hitlist
The developed tool firstly import the information from PDC file which contains
the placement of cell instances programmed and used in the design. The PDC file
includes characteristics of the placement of cell instances programmed and used
in the design. For each TID heatmap, the tool generated a hitlist considering two
conditions: Firstly, the VersaTile of the placed cell is affected by TID effects directly
which leads to delay increment inside cell. Secondly, the path connected to the input
ports of the cell is affected which leads to delay increment of the interconnection.
For the first condition, the tool is developed in a way that takes into account
an important features which is considering also the architecture of the VersaTiles.
Therefore, when the VersaTile is programmed to implement different types of logic
gates, the performance degradation is different with same TID. Therefore, the tool
elaborate the information of the cell placed(programmed) in the affected VersaTile,
such as type of the cell, used input and output port and merge them with the in-
formation in heatmap and the PDModel to calculate delay increment within the
cell.
Differently, for the second condition, it is essential to extract the routing informa-
tion from the design with the FPGA used commercial design tool. Therefore, we
build a simplified hypothetical routing model with the following assumption:
1. Presence of just horizontal or vertical connection between the source port and
destination port.
2. Evenly distribution of propagation delay along the path.
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Fig. 7.6 Algorithm for generation of instrumented SDF.
With the placement information of the source port and destination port, the
heatmap and PDModel, the delay increment of the affected path is calculated using
the equation 7.1 in which Segiis each segment of routing along the target path,
Delay(PATH) is the path delay extracted from original SDF and ∂ is the performance
degradation co-efficient determined by the PDModel with respect to delay increment.
PathDelayIncr =∑
segi
Length(Segi)
Length(PAT H)
∗Delay(PAT H)∗∂ (7.1)
7.1.4 SDF Instrumentation
The delay information extracted from the original SDF during the back-annotation
phase of standard FPGA design flow and the generated Hitlist, a collection of instru-
mented SDF is generated reflecting different possible distributions of performance
degradation across the target device taking into account of the place and layout infor-
mational of the target design extracted from the Physical Design Constraint(PDC)
file. Figure 7.6 is representing the algorithm for generation the instrumented SDF
from Hitlist file.
7.1.5 Simulation Execution
In order to estimate the error rate information, we developed a simulation environ-
ment that uses instrumented SDFs and Post-layout of the target design as inputs.
Then, it uses a test-bench to provide input stimuli, which can be external test pattern
of the circuit or internal patterns and monitor the outputs to detect possible error.
The simulation environment is calculating the probability of detection error in the
output considering a specific accumulated amount of TID and generate the error rate
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report. Moreover, the information regarding the output where the error is detected,
the site and time of timing-check violation is reported by the simulation environment.
This information is beneficial for the designer to analyze the behavior of the design
considering the performance degradation introduced by TID and apply a possible
mitigation technique.
7.2 Experimental Results
In order to confirm the feasibility of the proposed work-flow, we choose five circuits
from TIC99 benchmark collection [22]. The characteristics of the chosen circuits
are reported in Table 7.1. The commercial design flow were used to generate the
Post-layout netlist, the PDC file and SDF back annotation file, which were later used
as input of the proposed flow.
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7.2.1 Experimental Setup
The chosen circuits are implemented on ProASIC3 A3P250 Flash-based FPGA with
a total of 6144 VersaTiles. Since satellites and space probes typically encounter TID
between 10 and 100 krad(Si) [109], for each bench-mark circuits 250 Heatmaps were
generated. In order to do this, the assumption was that particles hitting a VersaTile
generated 50 krad(Si) radiation, considering that the nearby VersaTiles will also
suffer performance degradation following Gaussian distribution. As it has been
mentioned before, we set 4 intermediate observation points for accumulation of TID
equal to 25%, 50%, 75% and 100%. 100% has been used to generate the reports
with better granularity for analyzing the performance degradation along the mission
life-time.
Two main models were applied in the PDModel for gate propagation delay and
net propagation delay. Regarding the first mpdel, data from [2] was used for different
performance degradation factor when the VersaTile is programmed to implement
various logic functions. Due to different implemented logic functions, the path
from input port to output port inside the gate is different. For the same dose, the
performance degradation in terms of delay increment is different with respect to the
gate type, represented in Figure 7.7. Results reported in [2] for different types of
gates are used in our model. However, we assume that the performance degradation
in equivalent for the gates in the chain.
Following, the original delay values with respect to the Manhattan distance
between two ports of gates placed in two different VersaTiles were extracted as it is
shown in Figuer 7.8. The data was extracted by:
1. Create a circuit design with two inverters.
2. Set the placement constraints to make the two inverters have desired horizontal
and vertical distance.
3. Synthesis and implement the design on the target FPGA.
4. Export the back-annotation SDF during Post-layout phase.
5. Extract the delay value from the SDF.
6. Report above steps for every combination of horizontal and vertical distances.
7.2 Experimental Results 163
Fig. 7.7 Performance degradation for different types of gates [2]
Fig. 7.8 Net propagation delay with respect to Manhattan distance between net source and
destination(X distance and Y distance separated)
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Fig. 7.9 Performance degradation coefficient model for routing net
A simple performance degradation model of the routing resources is build based
on the experiment reported on [108] which has been described in the Equation 7.1
and represented in Figure 7.9.
Adopting the placement information for locating the list of the cells, Heatmap
and Hitlist for each bench-mark were generated. The Hitlist contains the degradation
for each affected cell in terms of delay increment and then was used to instrumented
SDF. In generation of Heatmap in our developed environment and the selected
benchmark placement, not all the logic functions are exposed to TID effect.
The selected bench-mark circuits were implemented using Synopsys TetraMax
tool to generate test pattern using ATPS to automatically produce test-bench. Then,
the logic for monitoring the output and compare it with the golden output to detect
the errors was also added to the test-bench.
Finally, the instrumented SDF, Post-layout design netlist and the test-bench were
loaded into the simulation environment for automatically generation of error rate
report.
7.2.2 Error Rate Reports
Our proposed technique has been used to calculate the error rate of the bench-mark
circuits. To elaborate more, different error rates are calculated in four different stages
of accumulated dose effect. Figure 7.10 represent the calculated error rate.
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Fig. 7.10 Error rate results of the selected ITC99 bench-mark with respect to different
percentage for TID
AS it can be noticed from the Figure 7.10, the error rate increase with respect to
TID accumulation. However, the attractive results are related to the time or dose in
which the error is observed in the output. This result together with the information of
the location and time of the error and timing-check fail, are essential for a designer
to
As a last step, we performed the experiment with the heatmap where same energy
was distributed evenly across the chip. Comparing the result of this experiment with
the one explained before with the nonlinear distributions of TID effect, the results
shows that the even distribution leads to underestimation of error rate for the target
design which is not preferable during long term space mission planning.
7.2.3 Research advancement on Total Ionizing Does
In this paper,we presented a new workflowfor analyzing TID effects on Flash-based
FPGA taking advantage of instrumenting the simulation delay data from back-
annotation phase of commercial FPGA design flow. With the proposed workflow,
it is possible to model the performance degradation in terms of delay of both the
propagation delay inside the cell and the interconnection delay of route resources
induced by TID effects. Five benchmark circuits were used to demonstrate the
feasibility for automatically generating error rate report, which can be used as early
stage system assessment regarding TID effects. Considering the fact that the Heatmap
generation and PDModel used for Hitlist generation and s instrumentation are in the
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primary stage, radiation test experiments are outlined to provide more information
for refining the model and validating the precision of the proposed workflow.
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Appendix A
Research Achievements
The golden part of this dissertation is dedicated to Single Event Transient, covering
different phases of this phenomenon, form the generation until the mitigation. In
order to achieve this goal, several tools and algorithm have been developed to perform
an accurate analysis, identifying the behavior of the technology regrading Single
Event Transient and mitigate the design with respect to the performed analysis. This
comprehensive chain of tools for analyzing and mitigation of Single Event Transient
has been applied to several industrial projects such as EUCLID space mission project
with the goal of monitoring the dark space which the lunch is planned for 2020
carrying by European Space Agency. The developed SET analysis and mitigation
workflow has been part of the handbook Space Product Assurance Techniques
for Radiation Effects Mitigation in ASICs and FPGAs handbook, published by
European Space Agency.
Moreover, I have presented the developed chain of tools in the competition
organized by IEEE Council on Electronic Design Automation and the tool chain
has been knows as the Best EDA Tool for improving design automation for inte-
grated circuits and systems by IEEE Council on Electronic Design Automation
granted 1000 USD. Moreover, the developed tools have been a relevant part of
several collaboration contracts with European Space Agency.
In order to confirm the reliability of the developed tool chain, I have participated
in several radiation test in collaboration with European Space Agency, CERN, Thales
Alenia Space and OHB Italia, performed in several radiation chambers at CERN
facility. Several different devices have been disposed to the radiation beam such
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as ProASIC3 Flash-based FPGA, Xilinx SRAM-based FPGA and SMART fusion
Flash-based FPGA in order to study the effect of Single Event Transient and Single
Event Upset on the functionality of the device under the test.
